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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores a controversial issue of institutional trading behavior with conflicts 
of interest and information sharing. Using firms sued for alleged financial misreporting, the first 
essay examines whether analyst-affiliated institutions reduce the portfolio weights of sued firms 
prior to their analysts releasing the information through downgrade revisions – trading huddles. 
Empirical evidence is consistent with this behavior, particularly among the institutions with 
investment banking operations but without underwriting relationships with sued firms. Institutions 
with underwriting relationships only reduce portfolio weights significantly when their analysts are 
the first to provide downgrades during the class period, which is a proxy for the private information 
production period during which the public has no knowledge of firms’ wrongdoings. The evidence 
of post-trading stock performance suggests that analyst-affiliated institutions with investment 
banking operations have superior information. Overall, the evidence implies that the allegation of 
pre-release activities by trading huddle is not without merit. 
The second essay investigates whether the trading behavior is affected by tension between the 
asset management division and the investment banking business. Investment banks may coerce 
their affiliated funds to support clients of underwriting business, which creates costs borne by the 
funds’ shareholders – conflicts of interest hypothesis. Empirical evidence supports the conflict of 
interest hypothesis. Affiliated asset management firms tend to hold or even increase their 
stockholdings of the underwritten, sued firms significantly in the class period, while underwriters 
hold or sell the firms. Overall, underwriters’ support for the clients comes at the fund shareholders’ 
expense.  
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CHAPTER 1: DO INSTITUTIONS SIDELINE RETAIL CLIENTS’ INTERESTS? 
EVIDENCE FROM INSTITUTIONAL TRADING SURROUNDING SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS 
1.1 Introduction 
Financial institutions play roles in a broad range of activities through their divisions, such as 
underwriting, lending, and stock research. Bundling these activities enables them to retain and 
expand their business relationships with clients. For example, Duarte-Silva (2010) shows that 
underwriters having lending relationships with clients can better certify their equity issuance. 
Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) document aggressive stock recommendations among 
underwriters to compete for underwriting mandates. Massa and Rehman (2008) provide evidence 
of information sharing between divisions for the purpose of equity trading. However, the 
cooperation among divisions also potentially exposes them to conflicts of interest. Particularly, 
buy-side traders and sell-side analysts face pressures to help out the other divisions of a bank to 
maximize profits for the institution as a whole. For example, a bank’s traders may buy shares of a 
firm to support investment banking, while analysts may report optimistically biased 
recommendations to support investment banking (Michaely and Womack, 1999). 
Besides the above mentioned conflicts of interest, The New York Times recently published an 
article written by a former Goldman Sachs executive regarding the investment bank’s business 
operation and environment stating that the interests of the client are sidelined in the way the firm 
operates and thinks about making money.1 Investment banks trying to maximize their own profits 
thus may exploit their customers by trading securities with private information, which is, for 
example, obtained from other divisions or pre-released by analysts – the so called “tipping” (Irvine, 
Lipson, and Puckett, 2007). Another recent allegation of Goldman Sachs involved short-term stock 
                                                 
1 “Why I am Leaving Goldman Sachs” by Greg Smith, published by The New York Times 
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tipping to its biggest trading clients.2 These tips were the product of meetings known as trading 
huddles between Goldman’s stock analysts and traders. At these gatherings, research analysts 
would identify stocks that were likely to rise or fall because of coming earnings announcements, 
the direction of the overall market or other short-term developments. Some of their 
recommendations differed from ratings printed in Goldman’s widely circulated long-term reports. 
In this study, we examine the extent to which institutions benefit themselves by trading on pre-
release information and provide evidence on trading huddles. 
Financial institutions with their own analysts have two major channels through which 
information collected among divisions is released. The investment arms (asset managements or 
client accounts) reveal information through their trades, and in-house analysts release theirs with 
recommendations. Our primary interest is to examine the trading activities of institutional investors 
along with their recommendations on firms sued for alleged financial fraud. Therefore, if an 
institution has affiliated analysts following a firm and the institution also invests in the firm’s 
stocks, we classify it as an analyst-affiliated institution. 
To understand the effect of different types of relationships, analyst-affiliation institutions are 
further classified into four groups. First, underwriter analysts are financial institutions which have 
served as lead underwriter in the past 3 years for a firm covered by their analysts. Michaely and 
Womack (1999) document a potential conflict of interest inherent in underwriter analysts. The lead 
underwriter is responsible for the due diligence process, for “building the book” of committed 
investors, for the debut price of IPOs or SEOs, and for the aftermarket price support. The 
recommendations from underwriter analysts and their trading behavior would not be the same as 
other analysts without such an intensive duty.  
                                                 
2 “Goldman Fined $22 Million Over Trading Huddles” by Susanne Craig, published by The New York Times 
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Second, lender analysts are banks which have had in the past 3 years a lending relationship 
with firms covered by their analysts. Corporate lending is another important activity of banks 
through which the banks may be able to collect information about their borrowers such as the firms’ 
financial condition, creditworthiness, and even future performance. Massa and Rehman (2008) 
study how information flows within financial conglomerates by investigating loan market deals, 
providing evidence that affiliated asset management companies trade on shared inside information 
not available to the market. 
The rest of analysts are considered as independent analysts. They are financial institutions 
without any relationship with their covered firms. Among independent analysts, investment banks 
may have different levels of information and trading activities relative to pure independent analysts 
such as brokerage houses as well as banks without investment banking. Jacob, Rock, and Weber 
(2008) compares the earnings forecasts of analysts employed by investment banks with those 
employed by firms not involved in investment banking, and finds a relation between forecast 
accuracy and investment banking and also its informational advantages. We, thus, separately 
analyze independent investment bank analysts (independent IB analysts) from independent 
analysts without investment banking operation (independent non-IB analysts).  
Our sample consists of firms with alleged financial fraud during the class period, which marks 
the beginning and the end of wrongdoings. It provides a unique private information production 
period that allows us to look at divisional activities of affiliated institutions and address questions 
regarding how they trade and report stock value during the period. Another reason we use financial 
lawsuit firms is because analysts have an incentive to produce information and pre-release them 
due to the nature of potential large losses. Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) study short-selling 
prior to the release of analyst downgrades, and show that pre-announcement abnormal short-selling 
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is significantly related to the subsequent share price reaction to the downgrade. Clearly, the 
potential negative impact of a downward revision on stock price provides investors with a strong 
incentive to profit from pre-release trades. 
We use this setting to investigate whether affiliated institutional investors trade on a firm 
covered by their own analysts to benefit themselves from subsequent retail client trades. Although 
we do not have retail client trades directly, the fact that these institutions act before releasing 
recommendations to retail clients is enough for us to infer whether they sideline these clients’ 
interests. We find that analyst-affiliated institutions tend to decrease their holdings in the 
recommended firms before their own analysts issue downgrades, particularly among institutions 
with independent IB analysts who do not serve recommended firms in underwriting business. 
Lender affiliated analysts appear to drop the firms and do not provide many revisions during the 
class periods. Underwriter affiliated analysts, on average, do not sell prior to any downgrades 
unless they are the ones to provide the first downgrade. In such a case, they sell significantly during 
the information pre-release period. Evidence of front-running is robust to controls for firms’ 
characteristics including size and book-to-market, investment bank reputation, firms’ past 
performance, institutional ownership, and analyst consensus and coverage. Furthermore, we 
provide empirical results with the finer classification for post-recommendation stock performance, 
showing that stocks sold by underwriter analyst institutions and independent IB analyst perform 
poorly in the long run, suggesting their informational advantage and accuracy. 
This paper contributes to the literature on institutional trading and analyst recommendations. 
Chan, Chang, and Wang (2009) explore how US financial firms trade relative to their own equity 
analyst recommendations, showing that the firm trades are consistent with their analysts’ research 
and recommendations. However, they investigate institutional trading in the quarter of- and after 
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a recommendation. As they discuss, strategic trading or trading aimed at benefiting from 
subsequent retail client trades might occur before the recommendation release. Jordan, Liu, and 
Wu (2012) and Haushalter and Lowry (2011) also look at the quarter of recommendation and the 
quarter after release to investigate institutional trading with analyst recommendations. We fill this 
gap by showing an empirical test of the same issue, but for the pre-release period.  
Secondly, our study differs from the literature focusing on market making activity of 
investment banks. Juergens and Lindsey (2009) examine NASDAQ market makers’ trading 
volume around analyst recommendation changes issued by an analyst at the same firm and find 
evidence of elevated sell volume at the recommending analyst’s firm in the 2 days preceding a 
downgrade. However, we examine quarterly holding changes during the quarter prior to 
downgrade issuance. It is much earlier than the 2-day window and helps us to identify whether the 
trades occur way before other clients’ trading activities. 
Thirdly, we add clarity to the question on institutional trading along with information sharing 
and conflicts of interest. According to Mehran and Stulz (2007), information plays a critical role 
in transactions involving financial institutions, whose main business is related to reducing 
asymmetric information for their customers, for example, by certifying new security issuance or 
reporting analysts’ opinions on a firm’s investment value. Therefore, consideration of the 
reputation capital of financial institutions may eliminate our concerns of credibility (Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri, 1994). Our findings, however, suggest that institutions have a tendency to 
emphasize their own profits, not those of their retail investing customers, by trading with pre-
release or privately obtained information and misleading their customers with optimistically biased 
recommendations in some cases. Therefore, we offer empirical evidence showing that the 
accusation of trade huddles is not without merit.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. We 
describe the data and variables in section 3. Section 4 and 5 report the empirical results. We present 
robustness tests in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
By our definition, affiliated institutions have their own analysts covering a firm, while they 
have a positive position in the firm. Previous studies on institutional trading with analyst 
recommendations document that institutions may trade before the release of analysts’ 
recommendations. Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007) find abnormally high institutional trading 
volume, especially buying, is because of tips received regarding the contents of forthcoming 
analysts’ reports. Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) provide evidence of front-running by short-
sellers, who are informed before downgrades. These are consistent with the tipping hypothesis, 
suggesting that analysts give their asset managers or clients a tip with respect to future 
recommendation revisions so that they can exploit the profitable opportunity. 
Recently, Goldman Sachs was fined $22 million for short-term stock tipping to its biggest 
trading clients, called “a dishonest and unethical violation” of the Massachusetts state securities 
act by Massachusetts regulators. Known as trading huddles between Goldman’s stock analysts and 
traders, research analysts would identify stocks that were likely to rise or fall because of coming 
earnings announcements, the direction of the overall market or other short-term developments. 
More interestingly, according to an article from The New York Times, the trading huddles grew out 
of a 2003 settlement with regulators in which several Wall Street firms, including Goldman, agreed 
to pay a $1.4 billion settlement to resolve accusations that they had been issuing overly optimistic 
stock research to win more lucrative investment banking business. The settlement requires the 
financial firms to put up firewalls between research and investment banking and also stop the use 
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of banking revenue to subsidize research. Consequently, Goldman management, seeking new ways 
to make money from research, introduced the idea of trading huddles and increased trading 
commissions in exchange for the trading ideas. Although this case indicates potential pre-release 
trading, little research has studied the overall magnitude and significance of institutional trading 
prior to analyst recommendations and its impact on other trading clients. According to the literature 
and news, we thus propose the first hypothesis as follows: 
H1:  Affiliated institutions decrease their holdings in the stocks of sued firms covered by their 
own analysts before the release of recommendations during the class period, relative to non-
affiliated institutions. 
No relation between trading activities and analyst affiliation provides the alternative 
hypothesis. The reputation of investment banks may help prevent the affiliated institutions from 
trading on the pre-release information. 
We further investigate the extent to which different types of analysts have different levels of 
information in terms of accuracy, or access to management, which, in turn, determines how each 
type of analysts trades based on their possessions of private information. Haushalter and Lowry 
(2011) find evidence that information from investment banking flows to other divisions of the 
bank. When investment banks advise acquirers in mergers, the banks’ stockholdings of the acquirer 
are positively related to changes in recommendations by their analysts. Jacob, Rock, and Weber 
(2008) document that despite the possible conflicts of interest faced by investment banks, their 
analysts nevertheless provide superior forecasts. Also, among investment bank analysts, affiliated 
analysts issue more accurate forecasts than non-affiliated analysts, conferring the informational 
advantages of investment banking affiliations. Accordingly, we also propose the following 
hypothesis: 
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H2:  Among the analyst-affiliated institutions, investment banks are more likely to decrease 
stockholdings in the recommended firms, relative to non-investment banks. 
However, possession of information does not necessarily lead to the execution of trading 
based on that information. For example, investment banking may pressure asset management to 
buy or not to sell the underwritten firm because of future potential business. Therefore, the 
alternative hypothesis is that the trading activities of the affiliated investment banks are 
indistinguishable from those of other affiliated institutions. We did not focus on lending 
relationships, which could also provide superior private information, in the above hypothesis 
because very few lender-affiliated analysts provide recommendations during the class periods. 
This silence itself may indicate a certain level of conflicts of interests in releasing negative 
information. However, for our purposes, we require an analyst’s action to be sure the information 
production occurs surrounding the start of a class period.   
The next step is to examine the performance of the stocks traded by each type of analyst-
affiliated institution. The affiliated institutions may trade with an information advantage or simply 
follow market trends. If the financial institutions have more accurate and superior information, we 
would expect that the stocks sold by the institutions produce more negative abnormal returns than 
the stocks purchased by the same institutions. Furthermore, since different types of affiliated 
institutions may have a different level of information and willingness to trade, we investigate post-
recommendation stock performance, traded by each type of affiliation. We, therefore, posit our 
third hypothesis as follows: 
H3: The financial lawsuit stocks in which affiliated investment banks decrease their positions 
prior to analyst recommendations under-perform stocks sold by non-affiliated investment banks. 
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Portfolio rebalancing without private information would not generate abnormal stock 
performance. 
1.3 Data 
1.3.1 Data Construction 
We examine institutional trading on firms sued in federal securities fraud class action lawsuits. 
The Stanford Clearing house offers detailed information on federal securities fraud class litigation. 
There are 1,977 unique firms (2,286 filings), securities of which are traded on New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ during our sample period, 
from 1996 to 2006. In order to identify the affiliated institutions and their holdings, we use 
Thomson Financial/Spectrum 13F data, providing aggregate holdings at the institution level, and 
I/B/E/S for brokerage house information.3 Employers of analysts and their equity ownership on 
filing firms are collected with the I/B/E/S Broker Translation file, and also through a hand-
matching process.4  
I/B/E/S also provides analysts’ recommendations. We obtain variables including the 
announcement dates of recommendations, reporting analysts, number of analyst following, 
brokerage houses employing the analysts, the level of the consensus recommendation as well as 
each analyst’s recommendation. To identify lending relationships between financial institutions 
and recommended firms, we use the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database, which 
contains identification of a lead arranger of each borrower’s package loan deal. 
                                                 
3 Under the SEC Act of 1934, all institutional investors with security assets of $100 million or more under 
discretionary management are required to report their holdings each quarter on Form 13f. 
4 The I/B/E/S Broker Translation file only covers up to 2006. 
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For stock performance information, Center for Research in Security (CRSP) is used for the 
stock price, return, and shares outstanding. We obtain accounting figures in financial statements 
from COMPUSTAT to see firms’ financial characteristics such as total assets, book value, and 
leverage. 
1.3.2 Sample Selection 
To look at whether affiliated institutional investors change their holdings on financial lawsuit 
firms, we first identify the lawsuit firms that are recommended by analysts during an event window, 
e.g. the class period. Filings for the lawsuit firms contain three important dates, the class period 
starting date (CPS), the class period ending date (CPE), and the filing date (FD). CPS shows when 
the wrongdoing starts, and CPE is the date at which that particular wrongdoing ends and is also 
uncovered. Figure 1 shows the time line of the dates. The period between CPS and the release of 
the first downgrade (upgrade) provides us with an important event window during which informed 
investors possibly make a profit by trading early based on pre-release information, and it allows 
us to examine whether affiliated institutions change their holdings during the event period. Thus, 
firms that receive at least one recommendation during the class period are selected. The class 
period recommendation is also confined to accompany a previous recommendation issued by the 
same analyst at least within 2 years, which affirms that the covered firms are still under the 
analyst’s watch, and enables us to see a revision of recommendations issued in a relatively 
reasonable window.  
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Figure 1.1 Time Line of Events associated with Lawsuits, Analyst Recommendations, and Changes in Stockholdings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Class period starting date: 
wrongdoing starts 
Class period ending date: 
wrongdoing uncovered 
Lawsuit filing date: 
lawsuit filed 
Information pre-release period 
Pre-release trading period 
 
Information production period 
 
First recommendation 
revision since the class 
period starting date 
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We began with a sample of 1,977 publicly traded firms. Our samples are filtered through three 
criteria. First, we exclude lawsuit firms that CRSP, COMPUSTAT, I/B/E/S, and Thomson 
Financial/Spectrum 13F databases do not contain. Second, we delete stocks with a price less than 
$1. Third, we focus on first financial lawsuits for each firm that could contain significant negative 
information and avoid firms that have already had lawsuits before. i.e., we keep firms with only 
one lawsuit. Finally, 660 unique firms (associated with 831 lawsuits) meet our criteria. 
 Table 1 shows the sample firm distribution and the reasons for filing securities class action 
lawsuits from 1996 to 2006. Our sample (660 firms with one lawsuit) contains the majority of sued  
Table 1.1 Financial Lawsuits and Sample Firms 
 
       Sample firms Number of lawsuits Number of  firms 
All sued firms  2,286 1,977 
Filtered firms  831 740 
Firms with 1 lawsuit   660 
                    2 lawsuits   71 
                    3 lawsuits   7 
                    4 lawsuits   2 
                                  5 or more lawsuits     0 
 
Reasons for filing lawsuits   Number of  firms % 
General financial misreporting  616 74.13 
Artificially inflate securities prices  576 69.31 
Inadequate internal control  151 18.17 
Bond issuance related  55 6.62 
Equity issuance related  125 15.04 
Mergers and acquisitions related  86 10.35 
Insider trading and conflict of interest  349 42.00 
SEC 1934 Sections 10(b) and rule 10b-5  584 70.28 
SEC 1933 Section 11  149 17.93 
GAAP violation/improper accounting  300 36.10 
Investment banks also sued in the same filing   36 4.33 
Total number of lawsuits   831  
 
Notes: This table reports the number of financial lawsuits and sample firms and the distribution of the reasons for 
filing securities class action lawsuits during 1996 to 2006. 
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firms. For the total number of 831 lawsuit filings, general financial misreporting and artificially 
inflating securities prices, both violating SEC 1934 section 10(b) and rule, are the most popular 
reasons. 
We classify recommendation revisions into two groups: downgrades and upgrades. A 
downgrade is a recommendation revised by an analyst from a higher level (e.g. strong buy or buy) 
to lower level (e.g. underperform or sell) and vice versa for an upgrade. Sometimes analysts do 
not change their recommendations, which is also classified as upgrade. Analysts usually issue more 
than one recommendation on a stock during the class period. We keep all recommendations until 
the first downgrade is issued. Also, we only consider the very first downgrade (upgrade) for each 
firm among analyst recommendations, as it contains the most significant impact on a stock and 
triggers subsequent downgrades (upgrades). 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the sample firms from 1996 to 2006. Panel A shows 
the summary of observations satisfying the sample selection criteria for downgrade (upgrade). 
Although we focus on financial lawsuit firms, some of them get upgrades only. In Panel A, the 
sample size of downgraded firms is around 7.5 times larger than upgraded firms due to the nature 
of the population. There are 582 (78) downgraded (upgraded only) firms, and the total number of 
institutional investors’ holding changes on each group of firms during the quarter before the 
downgrades (upgrades) is 126,644 (13,010).  
Average (median) class periods for all sample firms are about 434 (311) days during which 
analysts can discover a covered firm’s wrongdoing and inform investors of uncovered bad news. 
Analysts, in particular, have an incentive to find out negative information early, raising their 
reputation, attracting clients, and compensating their efforts with trading commissions (Irvine, 
2004).  
  
 
14 
 
Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms 
 
Panel A. Summary of observations 
  All 
Firms with downgrades 
during the class period 
Firms with only 
upgrades during the 
class period 
Number of unique firms in the sample 660 582 78 
Total number of institutional  
holding changes 
139,654 126,644 13,010 
Average (median) number of  
days during the class period 
434 (311) 459 (323) 243 (207) 
Average (median) number of days from the 
class period starting date to the date of the first 
revision 
161  (97) 170 (105) 91 (52) 
 
Panel B. Sample firm distribution by revisions 
Recommendation revisions 
# of downgraded 
firms 
# of upgraded 
firms 
Firms without upgrade (downgrade) prior to downgrade (upgrade) 474 73 
          with one upgrade (no revision) prior to downgrade (upgrade) 94 5 
   with two upgrades (no revision) prior to downgrade 12 
 
   with three upgrades (no revision) prior to downgrade 2  
Total  582 78 
 
Panel C. Financial characteristics and control variables 
Variables All 
Firms with downgrades 
during the class period 
Firms with only upgrades 
during the class period 
Total assets (million) 7,793 8,502 2,454 
Market value (million) 6,861 6,553 9,179 
Book-to-market 0.39 0.40 0.29 
Long-term debt-to-total Assets 0.16 0.17 0.14 
Trading volume (millions) 21.16 21.96 15.17 
Market-adjusted return 0.13 0.11 0.25 
Average number of  
analyst following 
9.09 9.40 6.79 
 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the firms with class-action lawsuits in our sample from 1996 to 2006. 
The group of firms with downgrades includes all the sample firms that receive at least one downgrade during the class 
period over which sued firms allegedly commit wrongdoing. The firms in the group may or may not have upgrades. 
The other group of the sample firms includes firms that receive only upgrades during the class period. Panel A presents 
the summary of observations, including the number of unique firms, the total number of institutional holding changes, 
average (median) number of days during the class period, and average (median) number of days from the class period 
starting date to the date of the first downgrade (first upgrade). Panel B shows the distribution of sample firms by 
revisions. Panel C reports financial characteristics and control variables for the sample firms. All the variables are 
reported as mean values and computed using the relevant Compustat and CRSP data items. Total assets and market 
value are reported in millions. Market value is calculated as the price multiplied by shares outstanding. Book-to-
Market equals the book value, which is common equity, divided by market capitalization. Leverage is a ratio of long 
term debts to total assets. Trading volume, market-adjusted return (past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns minus 
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CRSP value-weighted index return), where t is the month of the first recommendation revision, and the average 
number of analysts following a sample firm are also reported. 
 
It takes on average 170 (91) days for analysts to issue the first downgrade (upgrade) about the 
covered firms, implying that downgrades need more time in part because of a reluctance of 
analyst’s to issue downward revision (Mao and Song, 2012). 
Panel B presents the sample firm distribution by revisions. Among 582 downgraded firms, 
474 firms receive first downgrades without prior upgrades since the CPS. The number of firms 
which receive one upgrade before finally getting downgraded is 94. More than 97% of downgraded 
firms have 0 or 1 upgrade prior to the first downgrade. The upgraded only firms are the firms 
which do not receive any downgrade during the class period. Panel C reports financial 
characteristics of firms and control variables of our analysis, including accounting variables such 
as total assets, book value of equity, and long-term debt to total asset ratio, which are measured at 
the fiscal year-end preceding the first downgrade (upgrade) on each firm during the class period. 
All others including trading volume, market-adjusted return calculated as past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) 
cumulated returns minus CRSP value-weighted index return, and analyst coverage are measured 
at the end of the quarter prior to the first revision. The downgraded firms are relatively larger than 
the upgraded firms in terms of total assets. However, average market values of the upgraded firms 
are higher than that of the downgraded firms. The higher book-to-market ratio indicates that value 
firms tend to get downgraded. On average, the downgraded firms tend to have a lower prior 
market-adjusted return than the upgraded firms. More than 9 analysts, on average, follow the 
downgraded firms during the class period. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the first recommendation revision issued by analysts 
during the class period. Panel A and Panel B report about the first downgrade (upgrade) revision, 
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respectively. Among 584 first downgrades, 84 (14.21%) downgrades are issued by underwriter 
analysts who wait 237 days for revision since the CPS. The scaled number of days is calculated as 
the number of days until issuing the downgrades (upgrades) since the CPS divided by the number 
of days during the class period multiplied by 100, which provides a timeliness on updating 
information regarding the firms by analysts (Mao and Song, 2012). Underwriter analysts tend to 
issue downgrades slowly relative to the other analysts, which is consistent with Mao and Song that 
underwriters are discouraged to disclose negative news on firms with an underwriting relationship. 
In contrast to underwriter analysts, since independent analysts (both independent IB analysts and 
independent non-IB analysts) and independent research firms which are pure research institutions 
without trading arms are not associated with the firms for other business activities, they tend to 
release information promptly. Lenders issue the first downgrades very infrequently relative to 
others, indicating that they are reluctant to reveal negative information because of the possibility 
of ruining potential profits. The percentage of non-first revision suggests their reluctance as well. 
For Panel B, most interestingly, underwriters are more likely to issue upgrades promptly relative 
to downgrades, which have a higher percentage of first revision and a lower scaled number of days, 
showing their support for the underwritten firm even though they were sued later. 
Panel C provides buy and hold returns on the firms during each holding period. Both 
downgraded firms and upgraded firms have positive buy and hold returns until analysts issue 
downgrades or upgrades since the CPS. However, investors finally react negatively to the first 
downgrade according to buy and hold returns up to the CPE from the CPS. Since the public realizes 
sued firms’ wrongdoing on the CPE, returns would turn negative, resulting in a negative buy and 
hold stock return for the period from the CPE to the FD. Overall, buy and hold returns for the 
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entire period from the CPS to the FD are -0.2218 for downgraded firms and -0.2976 for upgraded 
firms. 
Table 1.3 Descriptive Statistics for First Recommendation Revisions 
 
Panel A. First downgrade revision 
Issuer No. % 
# of days until issuing 
the downgrade since 
the class period start 
Scaled 
# days 
% of non-
first revision 
Underwriter analyst  83 14.21 237 (183) 56.16 96.93 
Lender analyst  4 0.68 140 (148) 33.17 98.98 
Independent analyst  196 33.56 148 (86) 31.82 93.65 
Independent  research firm 301 51.54 166 (101) 35.69 91.66 
Total 584    100       
 
Panel B. First upgrade revision 
Issuer No. % 
# of days until issuing 
the upgrade since 
the class period start 
Scaled 
# days 
% of non-
first 
revision 
Underwriter analyst  16 20.51 102 (66) 35.29 98.62 
Lender analyst  2 2.82 230 (230) 68.24 99.25 
Independent analyst  19 24.35 64 (35) 29.62 98.74 
Independent  research firm 41 52.56 93 (53) 39.91 96.85 
Total 78 100       
 
Panel C. Buy and hold stock return         
Holding period 
  Downgraded firms Upgraded firms 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Class period starting date to first recommendation revision date 0.1350 -0.0199 0.1304 0.0795 
Class period starting date to class period ending date -0.0686 -0.2820 0.0049 -0.0797 
Class period ending date to lawsuit filing date -0.2483 -0.2409 -0.2935 -0.3070 
Class period starting date to lawsuit filing date -0.2218 -0.4517 -0.2976 -0.3553 
 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the first recommendation revision issued by analysts during the 
class period from 1996 to 2006. The class period is the period during which sued firms allegedly commit 
wrongdoing.  Panel A (Panel B) reports about first downgrades (first upgrades), showing the number of firms, the 
number of days until issuing the downgrades since the class period starting date (CPS), the scaled number of days 
calculated as the number of days until issuing the downgrades since the class period starting date divided by the 
number of days during the class period multiplied by 100, and the percentage of non-first revision issuance, based 
on the type of analyst institutions. Underwriter analysts are financial institutions with analysts covering the sample 
firms, which also have an underwriting relationship with the firms. Lender analysts have a lending relationship with 
covered firms. Independent analysts have neither underwriting nor lending relationship with covered firms. 
Independent research firms are pure research firms without trading arms. Panel C reports buy and hold returns of the 
sample firms over different holding periods.
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1.4 Empirical Results 
Our primary interest is to examine the extent to which institutions with the channels for private 
information trade before other trading clients. We start by providing how to measure institutional 
trading. Four different measures of changes in institutional holdings are constructed as follows: 
(1) Raw holding change (RHC), measured simply by changes in stockholdings from t-2 to t-1, 
where quarter t is the quarter of analysts issuing the first downgrade (upgrade). 
(2) Percentage holding change (PHC), measured by changes in the proportion of institutional 
ownership from t -2 to t -1 
(3) Portfolio weight change (PWC), calculated as changes in each institution’s portfolio weight 
from t -2 to t -1, where the portfolio weight is shares held by an institution on a stock 
divided by shares held by the institution on all firms from t -2 to t -1. 
(4) Abnormal portfolio weight change (APWC), which is the change in an institution’s 
portfolio weight of a stock (PWC), net of the change in the all 13F institutions’ portfolio 
weight of the stock, where the 13F institutions’ portfolio weight is shares held by the all 
13F managers on a stock divided by shares held by all institutions on all firms from t -2 to 
t -1.5 
Investment bank size may have an impact on the degree of RHC and PHC because a bigger 
institution tends to have more assets under management. PWC is perhaps affected not only by 
holding changes, but also by price changes. Therefore, we calculate APWC to offset the impact on 
                                                 
5 We do not exclude affiliated investment banks for calculating the 13F institutions’ portfolio weight of a stock. 
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portfolio weight change caused by price changes as well. We keep all the quarterly institutional 
holding positions reported in 13F. 6 
1.4.1 Univariate Analysis of Institutional Holding Changes 
For our purpose of examining pre-release trading, we calculate changes in holdings a quarter 
before the quarter during which analysts revise their recommendations released to the public. 
Juergens and Lindsey (2009) show that selling activities increase two days prior to a downgrade. 
By examining the quarterly trading changes prior to recommendation releases, we are likely to 
capture the trading activites of affiliated institutions prior to tipping their clients. Chan, Chang, 
and Wang (2009) and Jordan, Liu, and Wu (2012) examine whether investment banks follow their 
own recommendation by looking at the holding changes in the quarter of analyst recommendation. 
It is, however, hard to identify whether investment banks react to recommendation revisions, trade 
beforehand, or react to the same public events at the same time, if quarterly stockholdings are 
investigated in the same quarter as an analyst reporting. Therefore, we avoid the endogeneity issue 
in the previous literature and use more conservative measures for institutional trading.7  
Table 4 provides average values of four different measures of changes in the stockholdings of 
institutional investors one quarter before the quarter during which the sell-side analysts report first 
recommendation revisions on the sample firms. We examine whether different types of analyst-
affiliation between a financial institution and a firm produce differences in holding changes. We 
categorize the sample firms in three ways: (1) firms without upgrades prior to the first downgrade 
(474 firms); (2) firms with one upgrade prior to the first downgrade (94 firms); and (3) firms with 
                                                 
6 Under the SEC Act of 1934, all institutional investors with security assets of $100 million or more under 
discretionary management are required to report their holdings each quarter on Form 13f. 
7 Our measures are conservative in the sense that we use quarterly holding changes from q-2 to q-1, where q stands 
for the quarter of recommendations, long before the releases. Informed trading may occur right before (2 or 3 days 
before (Guergens and Lidsey (2009)), or even hours before (Heidle and Li (2003)) the recommendation releases.  
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only upgrades (78 firms). Panel A presents results for the firms without upgrades prior to first 
downgrade since the CPS, showing that both analysts and non-analysts affiliated institutions tend 
to increase their holdings in the firms. The affiliated institutional investors, on average, increase 
their holdings (RHC) by 288,506, which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Similarly, the percentage holding changes (PHC) and the portfolio weight change (PWC) are 
significantly positive. Because of the size effect, portfolio weight change (PWC) and abnormal 
portfolio weight change (APWC) show more reliable estimates. PWC (APWC) is 0.0703% 
(0.0556%), significant at the 1% level. Non-affiliated institutions also increase their positions, 
making no statistical and economical differences in holding changes between affiliated and non-
affiliated institutions, except RHC indicating a significant increase in a position. However, 
underwriter analysts and lender analysts change their holdings significantly different from non-
underwriter analysts and non-lender analysts according to differences on PWC and APWC, 
suggesting different trading behaviors by those institutions.   
Panel B and Panel C present results for the firms with one upgrade prior to first downgrade 
since the CPS and the firms with only upgrades since the CPS. Looking at all analyst in Panel B, 
the means of RHC, PHC, PWC, and APWC are 56,713 shares, 0.0998 %, -0.0056%, and -0.0071 %, 
respectively, which are all statistically insignificant, suggesting that the analyst affiliated 
institutions, on average, do not change their holdings prior to the analyst recommendation release. 
In contrast to the trading behavior of the affiliated institutions, the non-affiliated institutions do 
increase their holdings significantly prior to recommendations, showing that all measures are 
positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level for RHC and PHC and at the 10% 
level for PWC and APWC.  
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Table 1.4 Holding Changes of Affiliated and Non-Affiliated Institutional Investors 
 
 No. of holding changes RHC PHC PWC APWC 
Panel A: Firm without upgrade prior to first downgrade since the class period starting date (No. of firms: 474) 
All analyst 5,322 288,506*** 0.0224*** 0.0703*** 0.0556*** 
  (5.61) (3.48) (6.90) (5.55) 
Non-analyst 109,213 74,514*** 0.0169*** 0.0715*** 0.0517*** 
  (14.8) (10.5) (22.81) (16.77) 
Difference 114,535 -213,991*** -0.0054 0.0011 -0.0039 
  (-4.14) (-0.81) (0.10) (-0.37) 
Underwriter analyst 746 90,168** 0.0256 0.0307*** 0.0274** 
  (2.01) (1.22) (2.59) (2.36) 
Difference 114,535 -5,747 -0.0084 0.0410*** 0.0246** 
  (-0.12) (-0.40) (-3.35) (2.05) 
Lender analyst 114 738,542* 0.1006* 0.0136 0.012 
  (1.66) (1.75) (1.52) (1.54) 
Difference 114,535 -654,736 -0.0835 0.0578*** 0.0399*** 
  (-1.47) (-1.45) (6.11) (4.77) 
Independent analyst 4,497 309,240*** 0.0203*** 0.0779*** 0.0611*** 
  (5.21) (3.04) (6.54) (5.22) 
Difference 114,535 -233,968*** -0.0032 -0.0067 -0.0095 
  (-3.93) (-0.47) (-0.54) (-0.78) 
 
Panel B: Firm with upgrade prior to first downgrade since the class period starting date (No. of firms:94) 
All analyst 505 56,713 0.0998 -0.0056 -0.0071 
  (1.37) (1.28) (-0.42) (-0.52) 
Non-analyst 10,205 12,427*** 0.0288*** 0.0237* 0.0223* 
  (2.75) (3.74) (1.94) (1.82) 
Difference 10,710 -44,286 -0.071 0.0294 0.0294 
  (-1.06) (-0.90) (1.61) (1.60) 
Underwriter analyst 174 119,671 0.2894 0.0216 0.0188 
  (1.09) (1.48) (1.10) (0.97) 
Difference 10,710 -106,892 -0.2615 0.0007 0.002 
  (-0.97) (-1.34) (0.03) (0.09) 
Lender analyst 6 -17,964 -0.0454 -0.0033** -0.0179 
  (-1.21) (-0.82) (-2.47) (-1.28) 
Difference 10,710 32,498** 0.0776 0.0257** 0.0388** 
  (2.08) (1.38) (2.18) (2.13) 
Independent analyst 327 24,278 0.0013 -0.0202 -0.021 
  (0.92) (0.02) (-1.12) (-1.15) 
Difference 10,710 -10,070 0.0317 0.0440** 0.0432** 
  (-0.37) (0.51) (2.02) (1.97) 
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(Table 1.4 continued) 
      
Panel C: Firm with only upgrade since the class period starting date (No. of firms: 78) 
All analyst 456 -5,292 0.0207 0.0149 0.0029 
  (-0.06) (0.59) (0.66) (0.13) 
Non-analyst 12,554 24,160*** 0.0315* 0.0526*** 0.0389*** 
  (3.13) (1.72) (4.61) (3.41) 
Difference 13,010 29,452 0.0107 0.0377 0.0359 
  (0.38) (0.27) (1.49) (1.42) 
Underwriter analyst 119 -49,885 0.0454 0.026 0.0253 
  (-0.33) (1.03) (0.89) (0.89) 
Difference 13,010 73,687 -0.0144 0.0254 0.0124 
  (0.49) (-0.30) (0.81) (0.39) 
Lender analyst 13 538,622 0.1348 0.0355** 0.0214 
  (1.16) (0.66) (2.00) (1.23) 
Difference 13,010 -516,009 -0.1037 0.0157 0.0162 
  (-1.11) (-0.51) (0.75) (0.79) 
Independent analyst 329 15,173 0.0147 0.0109 -0.0047 
  (0.16) (0.32) (0.37) (-0.16) 
Difference 13,010 8,161 0.0167 0.0413 0.0435 
  (0.08) (0.33) (1.31) (1.38) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a one-tailed test. 
 
Notes: This table reports the trading activities of institutional investors during the quarter prior to a recommendation 
revision by the type of revision and institution. The sample consists of the firms with class-action lawsuits from 
1996 to 2006.Affilaited institutional investors are classified as analyst institutions, underwriter analyst institutions, 
lender analyst institutions, and independent analyst institutions. Analyst institutions report recommendations on 
covered firms. Underwriter analysts are financial institutions with analysts covering the sample firms, which also 
have an underwriting relationship with the firms. Lender analysts have a lending relationship with covered firms. 
Independent analysts have neither underwriting nor lending relationship with covered firms. The trading activities 
are measured with holding changes, which are calculated as follows; (1) RHC, raw changes in shares held by an 
institutional investor, (2) PHC, percentage changes in shares held, (3) PWC, portfolio weight change, (4) APWC, 
abnormal weight change which is difference between portfolio weight change by an institutional holding and by 
overall institutional investors. Appendix A provides more detailed explanation. Panel A presents trading activities 
for the firms without upgrade prior to first downgrade since the class period starting date. All analyst shows all the 
analyst affiliated institutions’ trading, and non-analyst reports holding changes of institutional investors without 
analyst affiliation. Underwriter analyst, lender analyst, and independent analyst also present their changes in 
holdings of the sample firms. Test of differences for each analyst type is compared to all institutions without such 
type of analyst affiliated institutions. Panel B and Panel C present trading activities for the firms with upgrades prior 
to first downgrades and firms with only upgrades since the class period starting date, respectively. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  
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However, there are no significant differences in all the measures between analyst and non-analyst 
institutions. Panel C shows a similar pattern to Panel B. For upgraded firms, all the measures of 
differences between affiliated and non-affiliated institutions show as insignificantly different, 
indicating that all institutional investors trade in the same direction. The univariate analysis shows 
somewhat mixed results on holding changes. Next we further investigate sources of the difference 
in a regression analysis setting. 
1.4.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis of Institutional Holding Changes before Analyst 
Recommendations 
 
Whether analyst-affiliated institutions trade prior to recommendation revisions is our primary 
interest. We conduct multivariate regression analyses in which control variables studied in the 
previous literature are taken into consideration. Appendix A contains detailed definitions of the 
variables. 
Two key variables are of interest in our regressions, including analyst holding (AH) and first 
revision issuer (FRI). AH and FRI are dummy variables to designate identification of institutional 
investors whose analysts covers the sued firms and whose analysts issue the first revisions, 
respectively. A negative coefficient on AH indicates that an affiliated institution decreases its 
holdings more than non-affiliated institutions. As for a negative coefficient on FRI, a first revision 
issuer reduces its holdings more than non-first revision issuers including non-affiliated institutions. 
In order to investigate detailed sources for shared information and potential conflicts of interest 
that also play a role in trading, we employ a finer classification for analyst-affiliation as discussed 
in previous section, such as underwriter analysts, lender analysts, independent IB analysts, and 
independent non-IB analysts. 
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We also control other variables that may affect institutional trading. First, investment bank’s 
reputation is based on the bank’s market share in equity (debt) underwriting (%), calculated as a 
bank’s aggregated total dollar amount in lead underwriting divided by all deal amounts in equity 
(bond) markets in a given year. It may play a role in the investment banks’ pre-release trading in 
a way that high reputation banks possess more research resources and information advantage, and 
thereby tend to front-run before the market realizes. A star analyst (Allstar analyst), published in 
Institutional Investor “All-American Research Team” is more likely to have superior information 
and may be hired by a high reputation institution. For a sample of downgraded firms, a negative 
coefficient on Allstar analyst indicates that institutional investors weigh in their star analysts’ 
opinions, leading them to decrease their portfolio positions. We also report an interaction term 
between all-star analysts and first revision issuers, meaning that a first downgrade (upgrade) is 
issued by a star analyst.  
We consider initial portfolio weight (PW) that may lead to a different trading standpoint, 
especially when an investor has negative information because the potential reaction by investors 
may depend on the size of the initial position. Total institutional ownership (TIO) may have a 
different effect on trading because of transaction costs and monitoring by institutional investors 
(Ljungqvist et al., 2007). Brockman, Chung, and Yan (2009) also suggest that block ownership is 
detrimental to the firm’s market liquidity because of its adverse impact on trading activity. The 
level of recommendation consensus among analysts (analyst consensus) and the number of analyst 
following (analyst coverage) are included to control any effect from previous recommendations 
and information asymmetry, measured at the end of the quarter prior to the first recommendation 
revision. 
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Firms’ past performance and financial characteristics are also important pieces of information 
which are taken into consideration with market adjusted return, size, and book-to-market ratio. 
The market adjusted return (Market-adj return) is calculated as past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) cumulated 
returns minus CRSP value-weighted index return. The market capitalization (SIZE) is measured 
as price per share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, and book-to-market ratio is 
calculated as the book value of equity over the market capitalization. 
Table 5 reports the determinants of changes in portfolio weights during the pre-release quarter 
for each group of sample firms, all downgraded firms, firms without upgrades prior to downgrades, 
firms with upgrades prior to downgrades, and firms with only upgrades. Each panel of Table 5 
groups two similar patterns of recommendations. The dependent variable is the portfolio weight 
change (PWC), and robustness tests with abnormal portfolio weight change (APWC) will be 
discussed in Section 5. The regression results are reported both with and without investment bank 
and year fixed effects.  
Panel A shows regression results for firms with upgrades prior to the first downgrades and 
firms with only upgrades. We start by investigating the overall effect of analyst-affiliation on 
institutional trading, reported with the coefficients on AH from column 2, 3, 6, and 7. Interestingly, 
the coefficients on AH, -0.0379 with fixed effect (-0.0335 without fixed effect), are negative and 
significant, indicating that after controlling for other variables, affiliated investors decrease their 
portfolio weight 0.0379 (0.0335) % more than non-affiliated investors. Even for the firms with 
only upgrades for which analysts never downgrade during the class period, the coefficients on AH, 
-0.0568 (-0.0641), remain negative and significant.  
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Table 1.5 Determinants of Change in Institutional Holdings prior to First Recommendation Revisions 
 
Panel A. Firms with upgrade prior to first downgrades since the class period starting date Vs. Firms with only upgrades 
       
 Dependent variable: PWC 
Variables 
Firms with upgrades prior to first downgrades 
since the class period starting date 
Firms with only upgrades 
Analyst holding (AH) -0.0335* -0.0379*   -0.0568* -0.0641*   
 (-1.74) (-1.80)   (-1.66) (-1.87)   
Underwriter AH   0.0025 0.0012   -0.0370 -0.0245 
   (0.10) (0.04)   (-0.86) (-0.53) 
Lender AH   -0.0017 -0.0209   -0.0588** -0.0653* 
   (-0.05) (-0.53)   (-2.06) (-1.88) 
Independent IB AH   -0.0418** -0.0480**   -0.0737 -0.0894* 
   (-2.21) (-2.33)   (-1.61) (-1.94) 
Independent non-IB AH   -0.0807 -0.0823*   -0.0153 -0.0172 
   (-1.65) (-1.70)   (-0.31) (-0.36) 
Reputation -0.0150*** -0.0102* -0.0154*** -0.0113** -0.0105** -0.0098* -0.0097* -0.0085 
 (-2.84) (-1.83) (-2.91) (-2.02) (-2.01) (-1.70) (1.82) (-1.46) 
Allstar analyst -0.0059 0.0088 -0.0151 -0.0007 0.0347 0.0429 0.0366 0.0436 
 (-0.38) (0.54) (-0.81) (-0.04) (1.11) (1.35) (1.15) (1.35) 
First revision issuer (FRI) -0.0080 -0.0098 -0.0086 -0.0109 0.0299 0.0247 0.0320 0.0259 
 (-0.43) (-0.51) (-0.45) (-0.55) (0.68) (0.54) (0.71) (0.54) 
First revision from allstar analyst 0.0671 0.0726 0.0674 0.0728 -0.1084*** -0.0448*** -0.1087 -0.0450*** 
 (1.28) (1.40) (1.29) (1.41) (-4.39) (-2.58) (-4.39) (-2.60) 
Initial portfolio weight -0.1970 -0.1974 -0.1970 -0.1974 -0.1598*** -0.1625*** -0.1598*** -0.1625*** 
 (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-2.73) (-2.75) (-2.73) (-2.74) 
Total institutional ownership 0.0008** 0.0004 0.0008** 0.0004 0.0010* 0.0004 0.0010 0.0004 
 (2.09) (1.07) (2.10) (1.08) (1.74) (1.10) (1.74) (1.10) 
Analyst consensus 0.0040 0.0064 0.0038 0.0063 -0.0066 0.0244 -0.0066 0.0245 
 
 
(0.20) (0.22) (0.19) (0.22) (-0.39) (0.49) (-0.39) (0.49) 
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(Table 1.5 continued) 
Analyst coverage -0.0045* -0.0067* -0.0045* -0.0067* -0.0023 -0.0005 -0.0023 -0.0005 
 (-1.70) (-1.73) (-1.69) (-1.72) (-1.45) (-0.31) (-1.44) (-0.30) 
Size 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000*** 
 (0.03) (0.24) (0.03) (0.25) (4.42) (3.49) (4.42) (3.49) 
Book-to-market 0.0316 0.0423 0.0318 0.0425 0.0756** -0.0285 0.0761** -0.0276 
 (0.71) (0.84) (0.71) (0.85) (2.32) (-0.56) (2.33) (-0.54) 
Market-adj return 0.0002 0.0047 0.0005 0.0051 0.0140 -0.0505** 0.0141 -0.0505** 
 (0.01) (0.20) (0.03) (0.22) (0.68) (-2.51) (0.69) (-2.50) 
Intercept 0.0062 -0.0592 0.0060 -0.0592 0.0233 -0.1243 0.0230 -0.1250 
 (0.06) (-0.44) (0.06) (-0.44) (0.25) (-0.70) (0.25) (-0.71) 
Fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of obs. 10,710 10,710 10,710 10,710 13,010 13,010 13,010 13,010 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
 
Panel B. All downgraded firms Vs. Firms without upgrades prior to downgrades since the class period starting date 
       
 Dependent variable: PWC 
Variables All downgraded firms Firms without upgrades prior to downgrades 
Analyst holding (AH) -0.0075 -0.0072   -0.0032 -0.0031   
 (-0.46) (-0.44)   (-0.18) (-0.17)   
Underwriter AH   -0.0188 -0.0126   -0.0198 -0.0141 
   (-1.21) (-0.81)   (-1.13) (-0.80) 
Lender AH   -0.0359* -0.0374**   -0.0382** -0.0396** 
   (-1.94) (-2.33)   (-2.01) (-2.21) 
Independent IB AH   -0.0371*** -0.0390***   -0.0359*** -0.0397*** 
   (-3.15) (-3.25)   (-2.82) (-2.92) 
Independent non-IB AH   0.1044** 0.1058**   0.1183** 0.1200** 
   (2.03) (2.04)   (2.14) (2.17) 
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(Table 1.5 continued)         
Reputation -0.0136*** -0.0129*** -0.0096*** -0.0081** -0.0123*** -0.0119*** -0.0077*** -0.0062 
 (5.58) (-3.15) (-4.46) (2.18) (-4.72) (-2.84) (-3.25) (-1.64) 
Allstar analyst -0.0298** -0.0266* -0.0224* -0.0190 -0.0339** -0.0313* -0.0249* -0.0221 
 (-1.98) (-1.74) (-1.68) (-1.43) (-2.01) (-1.83) (-1.70) (-1.50) 
First revision issuer (FRI) -0.0317** -0.0314** -0.0344** -0.0346** -0.0327** -0.0311* -0.0345** -0.0332* 
 (-2.17) (-2.12) (-2.27) (-2.26) (-1.98) (-1.84) (-2.03) (-1.93) 
First revision from allstar analyst -0.0048 0.0110 -0.0047 0.0111 -0.0128* 0.0057 -0.0127* 0.0057 
 (-0.62) (1.34) (-0.61) (1.34) (-1.76) (0.71) (-1.75) (0.72) 
Initial portfolio weight -0.2106*** -0.2104*** -0.2106*** -0.2104*** -0.2036*** -0.2032*** -0.2036*** -0.2032*** 
 (-6.46) (-6.45) (-6.46) (6.45) (-6.25) (-6.23) (-6.25) (-6.23) 
Total institutional ownership -0.0015*** -0.0019*** -0.0015*** -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0022*** 
 (-8.18) (-10.00) (-8.16) (-9.99) (-9.08) (-10.60) (-9.08) (-10.59) 
Analyst consensus 0.0153*** 0.0288*** 0.0152*** 0.0288*** 0.0206*** 0.0331*** 0.0206*** 0.0331*** 
 (3.02) (5.58) (3.01) (5.57) (3.82) (6.04) (3.81) (6.04) 
Analyst coverage -0.0011* -0.0005 -0.0011* -0.0005 -0.0011* -0.0004 -0.0011* -0.0004 
 (-1.69) (-0.82) (-1.67) (-0.81) (-1.66) (-0.69) (-1.65) (-0.68) 
Size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (27.50) (27.32) (27.48) (27.28) (27.25) (26.97) (27.22) (26.93) 
Book-to-market 0.0292* 0.0268 0.0292* 0.0267 0.0474** 0.0434** 0.0474** 0.0433** 
 (1.77) (1.49) (1.77) (1.49) (2.52) (2.08) (2.52) (2.08) 
Market-adj return -0.0294*** -0.0299*** -0.0294*** -0.0299*** -0.0337*** -0.0329*** -0.0337*** -0.0329*** 
 (-4.89) (-4.93) (-4.89) (-4.93) (-5.28) (-5.06) (-5.28) (-5.06) 
Intercept 0.0815*** 0.0767* 0.0813*** 0.0770* 0.0747*** 0.0841* 0.0745*** 0.0842* 
 (2.93) (1.80) (2.92) (1.80) (2.57) (1.77) (2.56) (1.77) 
Fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of obs. 126,644 126,644 126,644 126,644 114,535 114,535 114,535 114,535 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
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Notes: This table reports regression results of portfolio weight change (PWC) for affiliated analysts’ recommendations. PWC is the dependent variable 
calculated as the change in portfolio weight of a stock in an institutional investor’s portfolio from at the beginning of quarter, which is quarter preceding 
recommendation quarter, to at the end of quarter. Independent variables include dummy variables that represent whether a recommendation is issued by an 
analyst affiliated with a financial institution holding the covered firm (AH), an analyst issuing a recommendation on a firm is employed by an underwriter of 
the firm (Underwriter AH), an analyst issuing a recommendation on a firm is employed by a bank lending the firm (Lender AH), and an analyst issuing a 
recommendation on a firm is independent of the firm. The independent analyst institutions are separated into institutions with (Independent investment 
banking AH) and without investment banking (Independent AH). Control variables include investment bank reputation (Reputation), recommendation issued 
by an Institutional Investor “All-American” analyst (Allstar Analyst), dummy for first revision issuer, first recommendation issued by an “All-American” 
analyst (First revision from Allstar Analyst), portfolio weight at the beginning of the quarter (Initial portfolio weight), total institutional ownership, median 
level of recommendation consensus (Analyst consensus), analyst coverage, market capitalization (SIZE), book-to-market ratio, market adjusted past 6-month 
returns (Market-adj return) calculated as past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns minus market return (CRSP value-weighted index return). More detailed 
information is in Appendix A. Panel A reports regression coefficients for all downgraded firms and firms without upgrades prior to downgrades. Panel B 
reports regression coefficients for firms with upgrades prior to first downgrades and firms with only upgrades. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
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The negative coefficients are driven by a different type of analysts between the two samples 
as we investigate further with a finer classification, shown in column 4, 5, 8, and 9. According to 
the detailed regressions, we find that independent IB analysts are the major sources for the firms 
with downgrades, and lender analysts are for the firms with upgrades. Looking at each type of 
analysts for the firms with downgrades, after controlling for other variables, the coefficients on 
underwriter analyst holding (underwriter AH) are positive and insignificant. Underwriter analysts 
did not trade differently from non-affiliated institutions. It is possible that they possess pre-release 
information, but do not want to exploit them by selling because of their support for the firms with 
an underwriting relationship. As a recent case of an IPO, Facebook, on May 18, 2012, went to 
public at its debut price of $38 per share, which fell to $27.72 on June 1. As the price fell, the lead 
underwriter of Facebook, Morgan Stanley, reportedly stepped in to keep the stock from breaking 
through its offer price while Reuters revealed that the bank's analysts downgraded their estimates 
about the future earnings of the company. Schultz and Zaman (1994) and Aggarwal (2000) 
document that underwriters repurchase large quantities of stock in the aftermarket. Lender analyst 
holding and independent non-IB analyst holding are insignificant. However, independent IB 
analysts, -0.0480 (-0.0418) are negative and highly significant, indicating more reduction of 
portfolio position on the firms than non-affiliation institutions. One possible explanation is that 
independent IB analysts have no underwriting relationship with the firms, and thereby are not 
under pressure like underwriters so that they can sell those firms which end up having downgrades.  
Another key variable is the first revision issuer, whose coefficients are not significant, 
suggesting no change in shareholdings. This indicates that those issuers do not decrease portfolio 
position because of upgrade coming up. A number of the controls are significant. Investment bank 
reputation (Reputation) matters in a way that high reputational institutions decrease shareholdings 
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more than low reputational institutions. PWC decreases more when the level of institutional 
ownership is higher. Firms with more analyst coverage incurred more selling.  
As for the firms with only upgrades, only 78 firms did not receive downgrades during the 
entire class period. Lender analysts are the sellers on the firms while other analysts are not. For 
the firms with only upgrades, the lender analysts may notice negative information related to, in 
particular, the firms’ debts.8 One possibility is that affiliated institutions do not view the analysts’ 
recommendations as informative. Thus, the institutions decrease their holdings based on their own 
research, regardless of the analysts’ report.  Another possibility is that analysts simply give the 
traders pre-release tips that differ from their reporting. Recently The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 
reports that analysts at Goldman Sachs sometimes shared with traders and key clients short-term 
trading tips that sometimes differed from the firm’s long-term research.9 According to our findings, 
the allegation is not without merit. Reputation, First revision from all-star analyst, and initial 
portfolio weight are negative and significant. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the same regression analysis for all firms with downgrades and 
firms without upgrades prior to downgrades. The results are similar between the two groups. In 
contrast to previous results, coefficients on AH are negative but insignificant. Looking at 
regression analysis with the finer classification, we find that lender analysts and independent IB 
analysts are negative and statistically significant, while independent non-IB analysts are positive 
and significant, offsetting each other’s effect on trading, and thereby making AH insignificant.  
Lender analysts and independent IB analysts significantly reduce their positions in both 
groups of firms, suggesting that they are able to execute transactions without pressure as 
                                                 
8 Investigating the detailed reason is beyond our scope in this study. 
9 Goldman’s Trading Tips Reward Its Biggest Clients, The Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2009 
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underwriters have. In contrast to other analysts, independent non-IB analysts which do not have 
investment banking operations trade in the opposite direction, meaning that they tend to increase 
their holdings prior to downgrades. There are two potential explanations in which a different type 
of the analyst affiliation may result in differences in the pre-release trading. First, a pure 
independent analyst institution does not obtain more accurate and superior information from their 
research divisions simply because the analysts themselves do not have an ability to gather 
information and produce quality research. Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2008) compares IB analysts 
with non-IB analysts, suggesting that the IB analysts’ forecasts are on average more accurate than 
forecasts made by other analysts. The possible resource advantages for the IB analysts include the 
employment of higher-quality analysts and investment banking affiliations. Second, investment 
banks may be less strict to the “Chinese wall”, and thereby share information more frequently, 
making them execute transactions in a timely fashion, which is consistent with the “tipping 
hypothesis”. 
FRI identifies whether the first revision is issued by an affiliated institution’s own analyst. 
Across the different samples and different specifications, the coefficients of the variable are 
negative and statistically significant, indicating that the first revision issuers tend to decrease 
shareholdings in the covered firms. We explore this issue in greater depth later in this section by 
employing interaction terms in which each type of analysts is multiplied by the first revision issuer 
dummy and find supportive evidence for this explanation. Whether the first revision analyst is an 
all-star does not affect institutional trading significantly beyond the overall effect of first revision 
analysts.  
Reputation is negative and highly significant, indicating more selling for higher reputation. 
For the initial position, it is negatively related to the holding institution’s later position, implying 
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that when a financial institution has a higher position, it is more likely to sell its shares in a firm 
for which its analyst has negative information. There is more selling for firms with higher degree 
of institutional ownership and higher past performance. Analyst coverage is highly significant. 
Institutional investors increase their position when the consensus is high. 
Table 6 reports the regression results with those interaction terms for all downgraded firms, 
where each type of analyst is multiplied by FRI. The coefficient on AH*FRI is -0.0314 (-0.0317) 
in column 2 (column 3), indicating that after controlling for other factors, affiliated institutional 
investors decreases their portfolio weight 0.0314% more when they issue first downgrades among 
others. Looking at the detailed regression analysis, we find that underwriter analysts and 
independent non-IB analysts also sell more only when they are the first revision issuers. The first 
downgrade is important because it signals firms’ overall quality to the public, triggering multiple 
downgrades afterward. And it is likely that the issuer collects information about a covered firm 
and dissipates it to the market in a timely fashion. Therefore, affiliated institutions would benefit 
from subsequent retail trading, if they are able to sell before the first downgrade, and the first 
revision issuers do so. Lender analysts are, on average, sellers although they increase their portfolio 
position when they issue first downgrades. The coefficients on independent IB analysts are 
negative and significant, suggesting that independent IB analysts are strong front-runners, even if 
they are not the first revision issuers. Other control variables remain similar to the regression 
analysis for downgraded firms in Panel B of Table 5.  
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Table 1.6 Changes in Institutional Holdings prior to First Recommendation Revisions issued 
 by Their Own Analysts vs. Others 
 
Variables Dependent Variable: PWC 
Analyst holding (AH) -0.0075 -0.0072   
 (-0.46) (-0.44)   
AH*First revision issuer (FRI) -0.0317** -0.0314**   
 (-2.17) (-2.12)   
Underwriter AH   -0.0191 -0.0123 
   (-1.20) (-0.78) 
Underwriter AH*FRI   -0.0289** -0.0363** 
   (-2.01) (-2.39) 
Lender AH   -0.0390** -0.0397** 
   (-2.05) (-2.39) 
Lender AH*FRI   0.0570** 0.0346* 
   (2.42) (1.97) 
Independent IB AH   -0.0384*** -0.0404*** 
   (-3.29) (-3.40) 
Independent IB AH*FRI   -0.0090 -0.0063 
   (-0.64) (-0.43) 
Independent non-IB AH   0.1113** 0.1128** 
   (2.05) (2.07) 
Independent non-IB AH*FRI   -0.1489** -0.1497** 
   (-2.22) (-2.25) 
Reputation -0.0136*** -0.0129*** -0.0097*** -0.0081** 
 (-5.58) (-3.15) (-4.48) (-2.20) 
Allstar analyst -0.0298** -0.0266* -0.0226* -0.0192 
 (-1.98) (-1.74) (-1.69) (-1.44) 
First revision from allstar analyst -0.0048 0.0110 -0.0048 0.0110 
 (-0.62) (1.34) (-0.61) (1.34) 
Initial portfolio weight -0.2106*** -0.2104*** -0.2106*** -0.2104*** 
 (-6.46) (-6.45) (-6.46) (-6.45) 
Total institutional ownership -0.0015*** -0.0019*** -0.0015*** -0.0019*** 
 (-8.18) (-10.00) (-8.17) (-9.99) 
Analyst consensus 0.0153*** 0.0288*** 0.0152*** 0.0288*** 
 (3.02) (5.58) (3.00) (5.57) 
Analyst coverage -0.0011* -0.0005 -0.0011* -0.0005 
 (-1.69) (-0.82) (-1.68) (-0.81) 
Size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (27.50) (27.32) (27.47) (27.28) 
Book-to-market 0.0292* 0.0268 0.0292* 0.0267 
 (1.77) (1.49) (1.77) (1.48) 
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(Table 1.6 continued)     
Market-adj return -0.0294*** -0.0299*** -0.0294*** -0.0299*** 
 (-4.89) (-4.93) (-4.89) (-4.93) 
Intercept 0.0815*** 0.0767* 0.0815*** 0.0770* 
 (2.93) (1.80) (2.93) (1.80) 
Fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Number of obs. 126,644 126,644 126,644 126,644 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
 
Notes: This table reports regression coefficients on portfolio weight change (PWC) for recommendation revisions 
issued by own analysts and others. PWC is the dependent variable calculated as the change in portfolio weight of a 
stock in an institutional investor’s portfolio from at the beginning of quarter, which is quarter preceding 
recommendation quarter, to at the end of quarter. Independent variables include dummy variables that represent 
whether a recommendation is issued by an analyst affiliated with a financial institution holding the covered firm 
(AH), an analyst issuing a recommendation on a firm is employed by an underwriter of the firm (Underwriter AH), 
an analyst issuing a recommendation on a firm is employed by a bank lending the firm (Lender AH), and an analyst 
issuing a recommendation on a firm is independent of the firm. The independent analyst institutions are separated 
into institutions with (Independent investment banking AH) and without investment banking (Independent AH). First 
revision issuer dummy is multiplied with each type of analyst affiliation. Control variables include investment bank 
reputation (Reputation), recommendation issued by an Institutional Investor “All-American” analyst (Allstar 
Analyst), dummy for first revision issuer, first recommendation issued by an “All-American” analyst (First revision 
from Allstar Analyst), portfolio weight at the beginning of the quarter (Initial portfolio weight), total institutional 
ownership, median level of recommendation consensus (Analyst consensus), analyst coverage, market capitalization 
(SIZE), book-to-market ratio, market adjusted past 6-month returns (Market-adj return) calculated as past 6 month 
(t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns minus market return (CRSP value-weighted index return). More detailed information 
is in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
1.4.3 Regression Analysis of Pre- and Post-Recommendation Period 
So far the empirical results support our hypotheses that affiliated institutions decrease their 
portfolio weights more than non-affiliated institutions before analysts’ revisions that potentially 
impact firms’ investment value badly. Once analysts reveal their opinion through 
recommendations, however, non-affiliated institutions may take on buying or selling that depends 
on the level of recommendation (e.g. buy or sell) as well. Therefore, we examine how changes in 
portfolio weights for the post-recommendation period are different from those for the pre-
recommendation period.  
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Table 7 reports the regression results for portfolio weight change during the pre- and post- 
recommendation period. We include interaction terms in which all the primary interest dummy 
variables such as AH, Underwriter AH, Lender AH, Independent IB AH, and Independent non-IB 
AH are multiplied by the post-recommendation period dummy variable (Post-Rec). We analyze 
two different groups of sample firms, all downgraded firms and firms without upgrades prior to 
downgrades. The results are very similar. In column 2 and 4, the negative and insignificant 
coefficient on both AH and AH*Post-Rec shows no difference in holding changes between 
affiliated and non-affiliated institutions. The post-recommendation period dummy (Post-Rec 
dummy) shows a statistically significant and negative coefficient, implying that non-affiliated 
institutions on average decrease stockholdings in the lawsuit firms after the release of 
recommendations. The results suggest that after pre-release trading of the affiliated institutions, 
the non-affiliated institutional investors realize the lawsuit firms’ quality through the first 
downgrades, and follow the direction set by the affiliated institutions. It provides the affiliated 
institutions with incentives to trade early and benefit themselves at the expense of retail clients. 
Column 3 and 5 show consistent evidence that affiliated institutions decrease stockholdings 
significantly during the pre-recommendation period, except the independent non-IB analysts. 
Underwriter analysts, lender analysts, and independent IB analysts lower 0.0337%, 0.0502%, and 
0.0494% for all downgraded firms (0.0349%, 0.0487%, and 0.0462% for firms without upgrades 
prior to downgrades) of portfolio weights significant at about the 1% level during the quarter 
before recommendations, while lender analysts and independent IB analysts increase those 
positions during the post-recommendation period relative to non-affiliated institutions. It seems 
that those institutional investors sell stocks at a higher price before negative news comes out, and 
then buy them at a lower price after downgrades when everyone else sells. The results support this  
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Table 1.7 Regression Results for Portfolio Weight Change during the Pre- and Post- 
Recommendation Period 
 
 Dependent variable: PWC 
Variables All downgraded firms 
Firms without upgrades 
prior to downgrades 
Analyst holding (AH) -0.0194  -0.0139  
 (-1.42)  (-0.94)  
AH *Post-Rec -0.0134  -0.0183  
 (-0.81)  (-1.02)  
Underwriter AH  -0.0337**  -0.0349** 
  (-2.55)  (-2.36) 
Underwriter AH*Post-Rec  0.0094  0.0224 
  (0.56)  (1.45) 
Lender AH  -0.0502***  -0.0487*** 
  (-3.96)  (-3.44) 
Lender AH*Post-Rec  0.0654***  0.0625*** 
  (5.47)  (5.02) 
Independent IB AH  -0.0494***  -0.0462*** 
  (-5.08)  (-4.64) 
Independent IB AH*Post-Rec  0.0255**  0.0200* 
  (2.13)  (1.81) 
Independent non-IB AH  0.1203**  0.1374** 
  (2.24)  (2.40) 
Independent non-IB 
AH*Post-Rec 
 -0.2082***  -0.2349*** 
  (-2.66)  (-2.81) 
First revision issuer (FRI) -0.0435*** -0.0458*** -0.0466*** -0.0478*** 
 (-2.80) (-2.86) (-2.65) (-2.66) 
FRI*Post-Rec 0.0819*** 0.0843*** 0.0892*** 0.0901*** 
 (3.35) (3.35) (3.25) (3.21) 
First revision from 
allstar analyst 
-0.0165** -0.0164** -0.0228*** -0.0226*** 
 (-2.05) (-2.04) (-3.04) (-3.03) 
First revision from 
allstar analyst*Post-Rec 
0.0869*** 0.0867*** 0.1144*** 0.1142*** 
 (5.85) (5.84) (8.21) (8.20) 
Post-Rec dummy -0.0804*** -0.0804*** -0.0874*** -0.0874*** 
 (-14.48) (-14.48) (-15.06) (-15.06) 
Reputation -0.0087*** -0.0069*** -0.0077*** -0.0057** 
 (-3.24) (-2.60) (-2.78) (-2.05) 
Allstar analyst -0.0055 -0.0028 -0.0073 -0.0041 
 (-0.73) (-0.40) (-0.89) (-0.55) 
Initial portfolio weight -0.1716*** -0.1716*** -0.1486*** -0.1486*** 
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(Table 1.7 continued)     
 (-7.10) (-7.10) (-7.39) (-7.39) 
Total institutional ownership -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
 (-8.33) (-8.33) (-10.78) (-10.77) 
Analyst consensus 0.0304*** 0.0304*** 0.0329*** 0.0329*** 
 (9.78) (9.77) (10.09) (10.08) 
Analyst coverage 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 (4.09) (4.09) (3.68) (3.69) 
Size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (26.10) (26.07) (26.61) (26.57) 
Book-to-market 0.0039 0.0038 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.54) (0.53) (0.04) (0.03) 
Market-adj return -0.0208*** -0.0208*** -0.0275*** -0.0275*** 
 (-6.65) (-6.65) (-8.36) (-8.36) 
Intercept 0.0060 0.0061 0.0178 0.0178 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.92) (0.92) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 253,288 253,288 229,070 229,070 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
 
Notes: This table reports regression coefficients on portfolio weight change (PWC) for recommendation revisions. 
PWC is the dependent variable calculated as the change in portfolio weight of a stock in an institutional investor’s 
portfolio from at the beginning of quarter, which is quarter preceding recommendation quarter, to at the end of 
quarter. Independent variables include dummy variables that represent whether a recommendation is issued by an 
analyst affiliated with a financial institution holding the covered firm (AH), an analyst issuing a recommendation on 
a firm is employed by an underwriter of the firm (Underwriter AH), an analyst issuing a recommendation on a firm 
is employed by a bank lending the firm (Lender AH), and an analyst issuing a recommendation on a firm is 
independent of the firm. The independent analyst institutions are separated into institutions with (Independent 
investment banking AH) and without investment banking (Independent AH). A post recommendation period dummy 
(Post-Rec) is multiplied with each type of analyst affiliation. Control variables include investment bank reputation 
(Reputation), recommendation issued by an Institutional Investor “All-American” analyst (Allstar analyst), dummy 
for first revision issuer, first recommendation issued by an “All-American” analyst (First revision from allstar 
analyst), portfolio weight at the beginning of the quarter (Initial portfolio weight), total institutional ownership, 
median level of recommendation consensus (Analyst consensus), analyst coverage, market capitalization (SIZE), 
book-to-market ratio, market adjusted past 6-month returns (Market-adj return) calculated as past 6 month (t-7 to t-
1) cumulated returns minus market return (CRSP value-weighted index return). More detailed information is in 
Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
strategic trading behavior of affiliated institutional investors. Independent non-IB analyst, however, 
trade in the direction indicated by first revisions. We will investigate post-recommendation stock 
performance traded by each type of analysts in the next section. 
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1.4.4 Stock Price Performance around Recommendation Revisions 
Prior results show that affiliated institutions decrease their holdings before the release of 
recommendations. In order to say that the trades by affiliated institutions are information-driven 
and designed to benefit themselves from retail client trades, we explore stock price performance 
around recommendation revisions. If underwriter analysts and independent IB analysts have more 
accurate and superior information, then the stocks purchased (sold) by the investment banks 
outperform (underperform) stocks purchased (sold) by the other analysts. Table 8 shows abnormal 
returns to first recommendation revisions. We calculate abnormal returns using a four-factor model 
(Carhart, 1997). 
 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4 ×𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, 
where 𝑅𝑡is the excess return in month t on a firm, 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the CRSP value-weighted market 
return minus the risk-free rate in month t, and 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 are month t return of 
portfolios based on size, book-to-market, and momentum effects. The abnormal return is the 
difference between realized return and expected return based on the model. The event window 
ranges from 2 days to 6 months. The announcement date of the first revision is the event date. 
Panel A of Table 8 provides cumulative abnormal returns around first recommendation 
revisions for all firms, upgraded firms, and downgraded firms. The total number of all firms is 660. 
Abnormal returns from all windows show negative and significant results. We separate the firms 
into two groups, upgraded firms and downgraded firms to see which firms drive the negative 
abnormal returns. Looking at the upgraded firms, consisting of 78 firms, a day before through a 
day after the upgrade, the investors react positively to the issued recommendation. However, the 
effect of upgrades ends shortly after 3 to 6 months, leading to negative abnormal returns. It is 
possible that even if these firms never receive downgrades, they may perform poorly. 
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Table 1.8 Abnormal Returns around First Recommendation Revisions 
 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns of sample firms surrounding first recommendation revisions 
   Pre-revision Post-revision 
Sample firms N 2 day (0,1) 3 day (-1,1) 3 month 6 month 3 month 6 month 
Upgraded 78 0.0325*** 0.0411*** 0.0019 0.0302 -0.1817*** -0.2448*** 
  (5.12) (5.28) (0.04) (0.56) (-4.79) (-4.56) 
Downgraded 582 -0.0629*** -0.0829*** -0.0463*** -0.0784*** -0.1617*** -0.3030*** 
  (-27.72) (-27.72) (-3.30) (-3.95) (-11.54) (-15.30) 
 
        
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns of all downgraded firms held by different types of analyst 
Type of analyst 
  Pre-revision Post-revision 
N 2 day (0,1) 3 day (-1,1) 3 month 6 month 3 month 6 month 
Underwriter 260 -0.0755*** -0.0977*** -0.0516** -0.0838*** -0.1508*** -0.2542*** 
  (-18.85) (-19.90) (-2.26) (-2.59) (-6.61) (-7.88) 
Lender 91 -0.0299*** -0.0364*** -0.0108 -0.0522* -0.1382*** -0.2416*** 
  (-7.19) (-7.15) (-0.45) (-1.55) (-5.81) (-7.18) 
Independent IB 455 -0.0606*** -0.0726*** -0.0395*** -0.0718*** -0.1384*** -0.2426*** 
  (-23.46) (-22.97) (-2.89) (-3.71) (-10.14) (-12.55) 
Independent non-IB 322 -0.0611*** -0.0666*** -0.0133 -0.0355** -0.1258*** -0.2476*** 
  (-21.42) (-19.07) (-0.98) (-1.84) (-9.25) (-12.87) 
 
Panel C: Cumulative abnormal returns of all downgraded firms based on trading by analyst 
Trading type  Post-revision performance 
One quarter 
prior to revisions Quarter of revisions # of firms 3 month 6 month 9 month 
Underwriter:      
Increase Increase 48 -0.0089 -0.0029 -0.1609** 
   (-0.17) (-0.03) (-1.78) 
Increase Decrease 54 -0.1210*** -0.0201 -0.1983*** 
   (-2.65) (-0.31) (-2.51) 
Decrease Increase 96 -0.1245*** -0.2022*** -0.2780*** 
   (-3.29) (-3.78) (-4.24) 
Decrease Decrease 34 -0.0844** -0.5135*** -0.5346*** 
   (-1.84) (-7.94) (-6.75) 
Lender:      
Increase Increase 34 -0.1284*** -0.2172*** -0.2574*** 
   (-3.91) (-4.65) (-4.51) 
Increase Decrease 16 -0.1533*** -0.2859*** -0.3643*** 
   (-3.04) (-4.01) (4.17) 
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(Table 1.8 continued)      
Decrease Increase 20 -0.1468*** -0.2165*** -0.2023*** 
   (-3.31) (-3.45) (-2.63) 
Decrease Decrease 8 -0.0823 -0.1971** -0.3078*** 
   (-1.08) (-1.83) (-2.34) 
Independent IB:      
Increase Increase 118 -0.1021*** -0.2399*** -0.3215*** 
   (-5.53) (-9.18) (-10.05) 
Increase Decrease 106 -0.1831*** -0.2743*** -0.3233*** 
   (-5.67) (-6.00) (-5.78) 
Decrease Increase 77 -0.1638*** -0.1726*** -0.2748*** 
   (-5.91) (-4.40) (-5.72) 
Decrease Decrease 53 -0.1283*** -0.4121*** -0.5778*** 
   (-3.01) (-6.85) (-7.85) 
Independent non-IB:      
Increase Increase 75 -0.1694*** -0.2859*** -0.3401*** 
   (-6.98) (-8.32) (-8.10) 
Increase Decrease 67 -0.1070*** -0.2211*** -0.3405*** 
   (-3.36) (-4.91) (-6.18) 
Decrease Increase 65 -0.0781** -0.1500*** -0.2272*** 
   (-2.08) (-2.82) (-3.49) 
Decrease Decrease 51 -0.0443 -0.2511*** -0.2218*** 
   (-1.09) (-4.40) (-3.17) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
 
Notes: This table reports abnormal returns around first recommendation revisions. Abnormal returns are calculated 
using the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997). Panel A presents cumulative abnormal returns on various event 
windows (2-day, 3-day, 3-month, and 6-month) for upgraded firms and downgraded firms. The number of firms in 
each category (N) is also reported. The event date is a first recommendation revision date since the class period 
starting date. Panel B shows cumulative abnormal returns of downgraded firms held by different types of analyst 
affiliated institutions over the various event windows. Panel C presents cumulative abnormal returns of firms that 
each type of affiliated institutions buys or sells a quarter prior to and of the first recommendation revisions. Buys 
(sells) are defined as those stocks for which affiliated institutions increase (decrease) holdings (measured with 
portfolio weight changes) in the quarter before and of the recommendation revisions. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
Additionally, they may have a downgrade after the class period end date when their 
wrongdoing become public, ending up facing a financial lawsuit. For downgraded firms, as we 
expected, they have negative and highly significant abnormal returns during the 2 and 3 day-
window. Those firms performed poorly even before their downgrades, which may prompt analysts 
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to issue the downgrades. During the post-revision period, the negative abnormal returns of 
downgraded firms are lower than those of upgraded firms. 
In order to see institutional trading, first we calculate cumulative abnormal returns for 
downgraded firms only held by affiliated institutions in Panel B. Among 582 downgraded firms, 
underwriter analysts hold 260 firms on the revision date. The firms have negative abnormal returns 
at various windows. Firms held by other type of analysts follow a similar pattern. Therefore, we 
further classify those firms into groups based on trading by each type of analysts, reported in Panel 
C. 
Trading type shows whether analysts buy or sell during the quarter prior to or of revisions. 
Since we may have more than one analyst holding a firm, the number of analysts is used to 
determine the trading type. For example, we count the number of analysts increasing PWC and 
compare it with those decreasing PWC. If the number of analysts increasing PWC is larger, then 
we call it “Increase”. Otherwise it is named “Decrease”. We drop firms having the same number 
of analysts increasing and decreasing. 
Within each type of analyst, Sells in quarter prior to revisions and Sells in quarter of revisions 
show the largest negative abnormal returns for 9 month. If analysts buy stocks during the quarter 
of revision, then most of the stocks perform better than the rest, and vice versa, which indicates 
analysts’ trading is information-driven. Among sells, investors react strongly for longer terms (6 
or 9 month window) to those stocks sold in both quarters by underwriter analysts (-0.5346 for 9 
month) and independent IB analysts (-0.5778), while the stocks sold by independent non-IB 
analysts have the smallest negative abnormal returns, indicating there is less reaction relative to 
other analysts. The results support our third hypothesis that affiliated investment banks have 
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superior information about the covered firms, and investors react much more to those analysts’ 
trading. 
1.4.5 Robustness Tests 
The evidence presented in this paper supports the hypothesis that affiliated institutional 
investors change their holdings prior to their analysts releasing recommendation revisions. 
However, the portfolio rebalancing may be driven by potential confounding events that occur 
before revisions. In particular, prior downgrades issued during the holding period would lead to 
reduction of portfolio position. Therefore, we control for any downgrade that was preceded during 
the quarter prior to revisions. Table 9 reports robustness tests using all downgraded firms with 
three different dependent variables. The first regression (1) using PWC as the dependent variable 
is the same regression for all downgraded firms in Panel B of Table 5 except Pre-downgrade 
dummy. The coefficients on the variable are negative and significant, showing institutional trading 
in response to the pre-downgrades. The coefficients of lender analysts and independent IB analysts 
remain strongly negative.  
To further ensure the robustness of the results, we use the abnormal portfolio weight changes 
(APWC) for regression analysis. The sued firms may be sold by not only the affiliated investment 
banks, but also overall institutional investors, providing a spurious relationship between analyst 
affiliation and banks’ portfolio changes. Therefore, we calculate the abnormal portfolio weight 
change, which is the change in the portfolio weight of a stock in an institution’s portfolio less the 
change in the portfolio weight of that stock in the overall institutional investors.10  
 
 
                                                 
10 We do not exclude affiliated institutions from the overall institutional investors. 
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Table 1.9 Robustness Tests 
 
  Dependent variables  
Variables (1) PWC (2) APWC (3) DPWC 
Analyst holding (AH) -0.0075  -0.0075  -0.0176  
 (-0.45)  (-0.44)  (-0.99)  
Underwriter AH  -0.0148  -0.0174  -0.0213 
  (-0.96)  (-1.14)  (-1.20) 
Lender AH  -0.0374**  -0.0304***  -0.0499*** 
  (-2.33)  (-2.70)  (-3.21) 
Independent IB AH  -0.0391***  -0.0416***  -0.0506*** 
  (-3.25)  (-3.47)  (-3.98) 
Independent non-IB AH  0.1065**  0.1158**  0.0991* 
  (2.05)  (2.14)  (1.84) 
Reputation -0.0134*** -0.0085** -0.0150*** -0.0097*** -0.0175*** -0.0125*** 
 (-3.31) (-2.33) (-3.93) (-3.03) (-3.73) (-2.99) 
Allstar analyst -0.0251 -0.0175 -0.0274* -0.0190 -0.0215 -0.0138 
 (-1.63) (-1.30) (-1.74) (-1.40) (-1.42) (-1.07) 
First revision issuer -0.0304** -0.0335** -0.0297** -0.0329** -0.0329** -0.0364** 
 (-2.05) (-2.20) (-2.08) (-2.20) (-2.08) (-2.22) 
First revision from 
allstar analyst 
0.0137* 0.0138* 0.0054 0.0054 0.0098 0.0099 
 (1.67) (1.67) (0.66) (0.66) (1.17) (1.18) 
Pre-downgrade dummy -0.0398*** -0.0399*** 0.0184** 0.0183*** -0.0468*** -0.0469*** 
 (-5.66) (-5.68) (2.63) (2.62) (-6.42) (-6.43) 
Intercept 0.0903** 0.0906** -0.1758*** -0.1755*** 0.0845* 0.0848* 
 (2.07) (2.07) (-4.01) (-4.00) (1.90) (1.91) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 126,644 139,654 126,644 126,644 126,644 126,644 
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
 
Notes: This table reports regression coefficients on portfolio weight change (PWC), abnormal portfolio weight 
change (APWC) and difference in portfolio weight change on sample firms and control firms held by institutional 
investors (DPWC) for affiliated analysts’ recommendations revisions. PWC is the dependent variable calculated as 
the change in portfolio weight of a stock in an institutional investor’s portfolio from at the beginning of quarter, 
which is quarter preceding recommendation quarter, to at the end of quarter. APWC is the dependent variable that 
equals to portfolio weight change of a stock (PWC) less the change in the weight of that stock in the overall 13f 
institutional investors’ portfolios. DPWC is the other dependent variable calculated as the difference in portfolio 
weight changes between sued-firms and control firms that are non-sued, located in the same industry, and held by 
the same institution. Independent variables include dummy variables that represent whether a recommendation is 
issued by an analyst affiliated with a financial institution holding the covered firm (AH), an analyst issuing a 
recommendation on a firm is employed by an underwriter of the firm (Underwriter AH), an analyst issuing a 
recommendation on a firm is employed by a bank lending the firm (Lender AH), and an analyst issuing a 
recommendation on a firm is independent of the firm. The independent analyst-affiliated institutions are separated 
into institutions with (Independent investment banking AH) and without investment banking (Independent AH). 
Control variables include investment bank reputation (Reputation), recommendation issued by an Institutional 
Investor “All-American” analyst (Allstar analyst), dummy for first revision issuer, first recommendation issued by 
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an “All-American” analyst (First revision from allstar analyst), and a pre-downgrade dummy indicating that 
analysts issue downgrades during the holding period. More detailed information is in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Columns 4 and 5 support our hypothesis that affiliated investment banks decrease the abnormal 
portfolio weights in the sued firms, relative to non-affiliated institutions. 
Lastly, we examine whether affiliated institutions decrease holdings of downgraded firms in 
excess of the decrease in holdings of the control stocks that are located in the same industry. 
Affiliated institutions might not only change their holdings in the stocks of downgraded firms but 
also do so in all the stocks located in the same industry. This would cause a spurious relationship 
between affiliation and trading. To avoid the potential problem, we employ difference in portfolio 
weight change (DPWC) as the other dependent variable calculated as the difference in portfolio 
weight changes between downgraded-firms and control firms that are non-sued, located in the 
same industry, and held by the same institution. The results (3) of Table 9 are similar to the other 
two. 
1.5 Conclusion 
We examine whether institutions exploit pre-release information obtained through divisional 
activities by trading securities of the firms covered by their own analysts prior to issuing stock 
recommendation revisions.  Using data on financial lawsuits that induce potential negative impacts 
of a downward revision on stock price, thereby providing analysts with a strong incentive to 
produce and pre-release information, we find that affiliated investment banks decrease their 
holdings in the recommended firms relative to non-affiliated institutions during the quarter prior 
to  downgrades issued by their analysts. Combined with evidence of stock performance, empirical 
results suggest that underwriter analysts and independent IB analysts have superior information 
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and execute transactions to benefit themselves at the expense of retail clients. Evidence of pre-
release information trading is robust to controls for firms’ characteristics including size and book-
to-market, past performance, institutional ownership, and analyst consensus and coverage. 
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CHAPTER 2: PRESSURE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WITHIN FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMERATES: EVIDENDE FROM IN-HOUSE AND ASSET MANAGEMENT 
TRADING 
2.1 Introduction 
Conflicts of interest and sharing of information among divisions within a financial 
conglomerate have been a controversial issue because they might undermine the best interests of 
clients and common investors. Mehran and Stulz (2007) summarize findings on the issues in the 
literature. Asset management firms belonging to financial conglomerates were found to perform 
better in particular for those stocks that have business relationships with the banks, supporting the 
idea that affiliated funds exploit private information from their banks as their own. On the other 
hand, underwriters could use their managed funds as a dumping ground for newly issued securities, 
indicating that underwriters support their business at fund shareholders’ expense (Hao and Yan, 
2012). 
Divisional activities may provide financial institutions with private information about their 
clients, which would give the institutions an information advantage. It, however, may create 
conflicts of interest between divisions as well if one division’s action is detrimental to the others. 
In the previous chapter, I use aggregated holdings (13F) to investigate the issue and find that 
investment banks exploit private information obtained through analysts’ research to trade stocks 
in advance. However, it is an empirical question whether the asset management arm and in-house 
traders trade in the same manner because the former is managing fund investors’ money rather 
than the banks’ own capital. If both investment banking and asset management firms of investment 
banks do not support their low quality sued firms, the problem of conflicts of interest between the 
asset management arm and its investing clients are not as severe, and otherwise, the interests of 
fund shareholders would be seriously compromised. This paper investigate whether investment 
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banks pressure asset management divisions to support clients of their underwriting business by 
examining trading of both the banks and affiliated funds on sued firms separately. 
Hao and Yan (2012) find that investment bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated 
funds because the affiliated funds hold disproportionately large amounts of stocks of their initial 
public offering and seasoned equity offering clients. These findings are consistent with the idea 
that investment banks use affiliated funds to support their underwriting business at the expense of 
fund shareholders. An alternative hypothesis is that affiliated funds take advantage of private 
information due to their banks’ business relationships with clients and resources.  
Massa and Rehman (2008) show that financial conglomerates use their mutual funds to exploit 
the information generated in-house by their lending activities. They provide evidence that the 
performance of the positions of affiliated funds in the stocks of borrowing firms exceeds that of 
their other positions in non-borrowing stocks located in the same industry. The former -
information sharing hypothesis- and the latter - conflict of interest hypothesis - make opposed 
predictions regarding the institutional trading, thus it is an empirical question of which of these 
dominates. The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the extent to which conflicts of 
interest affect the trading activities and the performance of affiliated funds. 
Our findings support the conflicts of interest hypothesis. Using the firms sued for allegedly 
misreporting, affiliated asset management firms do not decrease their positions in sued firms 
underwritten by their banks, while banks decrease their portfolio weights in the clients before the 
firms’ misbehavior is disclosed to the public. It seems that underwriters exploit private information 
to benefit themselves, meanwhile the information is not shared with their managed funds. In order 
to have more direct evidence, we compare affiliated funds’ stockholdings of clients to those of 
non-clients, and evidence shows that affiliated asset management firms hold a disproportionately 
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large amount of investment banking clients’ shares. Finally we find that the clients show huge 
negative abnormal returns after underwriters decrease their portfolio weights of the firms. 
Our study is related to Hao and Yan (2012). They investigate the performance of affiliated 
funds and document their underperformance due to holdings of investment banking clients. 
However, they do not analyze trading of affiliated funds and also do not show the extent to which 
the investment banks benefit themselves, which is one of the main driving forces generating the 
conflicts of interest. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we discuss literature 
and develop hypotheses. Section 3 shows data and sample. Section 4 present empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The conflicts of interest and information sharing among divisions within a financial institution 
have been extensively studied. Among other divisions, investment banking has been a central piece 
as they share privately collected information and pressure other divisions for their own business 
profits. According to the Securities Industry Association, the ten largest investment banks earn up 
to 65% of revenues from their underwriting business (Morrison and Wilhelm, 2007). Because of 
the huge portion of revenue from investment banking, it is possible that banks try to compete for 
underwriting business.  
Hao and Yan (2012) find that investment bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated 
funds. Affiliated funds hold worse-performing clients of underwriting business more than 
unaffiliated funds, consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis. Investment banks use 
affiliated funds to support their underwriting business at the expense of fund shareholders. Ritter 
and Zhang (2007) examine the dumping ground hypothesis that a lead underwriter allocates cold 
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IPOs to its affiliated funds for future underwriting business. They find, however, little evidence of 
the dumping ground hypothesis.  
Previous studies also show evidence supporting the information advantage hypothesis. 
Investment banks may acquire superior information about their clients through the process of due 
diligence. Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2008) find that analysts’ forecasts of investment banks are on 
average more accurate than forecasts made by other analysts. And among investment bank analysts, 
analysts whose employer has an investment banking relationship with followed firms issue more 
accurate forecasts, conferring information advantage. It may indicate that the investment banks 
might share private information among other divisions, and it, thus, may bring additional profits 
to the banks. 
 Massa and Rehman (2008) study how information flows within financial conglomerates by 
analyzing the relations between mutual funds and banks that belong to the same financial group. 
Using a borrower-lender relationship, they find that affiliated funds increase their stakes in the 
borrowing firms, and the performance of the positions of affiliated funds in the stocks of borrowing 
firms exceeds that of their other positions in non-borrowing stocks located in the same industry as 
well as that of other stocks having similar characteristics. This paper examines both the conflict of 
interest hypothesis and the information advantage hypothesis by looking at in-house trading and 
asset management trading separately. 
To understand the effect of business relationships, financial institutions are grouped into 
underwriters, lenders, and analysts. Underwriters are financial institutions which serve a firm as 
lead underwriter in the past 3 years. Lenders are banks which have a lending relationship with 
firms in the past 3 years. Analysts are institutions that employ analysts covering firms. Within each 
type of groups, we separate in-house trading divisions from asset management divisions.  
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Underwriters face conflicts of interest such that they may not dump stocks of their clients, and 
even purchase through proprietary trading accounts or affiliated mutual fund accounts for after-
market support. Alternatively, the information advantage hypothesis is that institutions with 
underwriting relationships sell the sued firms, relative to non-underwriting institutions. For the 
prediction, we examine in-house trading and asset management trading separately. The conflicts 
of interest hypothesis predicts that investment banks with underwriting relationships pressure their 
funds to support underwritten firms. 
H1: Affiliated asset management firms of underwriters buy or hold underwritten firms, 
relative to unaffiliated funds. 
A negative relationship between trading activities and underwriting relationships provides the 
alternative hypothesis that the conflicts of interest between the affiliated funds and their 
shareholders are not severe.  
We also compare the amount of holdings of client firms to those of non-client firms by the 
financial institutions with underwriting relationships. Hao and Yan (2012) find that affiliated funds 
hold a disproportionately large amount of their investment banking clients’ shares. Thus, the 
second hypothesis is as follows; 
H2: Underwriters and their affiliated asset management firms hold a disproportionately large 
amount of clients’ shares, relative to non-clients’ shares. 
The information advantage hypothesis predicts that investment banks hold smaller amounts of 
clients’ shares. 
Lastly, underwritten firms held by underwriters and their affiliated funds may perform poorly. 
Hao and Yan (2012) find that investment bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds 
due to the conflicts of interest. The affiliated funds hold disproportionately large amounts of stocks 
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of their initial public offering and seasoned equity offering clients that, on average, perform poorly 
in the long run. We propose the third hypothesis as follows: 
H3: Firms in which asset management firms increase or hold their positions have negative 
abnormal returns. 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Data and Sample 
We examine institutional trading on the firms sued in federal securities fraud class action 
lawsuits. The Stanford Clearing house offers detailed information on federal securities fraud class 
litigation. In order to identify the affiliated institutions and their holdings, we hand-collected the 
11 largest investment banks’ equity holdings from the first quarter of 2005 to the last quarter of 
2009 from Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR (SEC EDGAR). The investment banks 
are Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Holdings, JP Morgan, 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo. We collected the 
banks’ holdings as well as holdings of their asset management divisions which report equity 
positions consistently through the sample period.11  
We use I/B/E/S for brokerage house information, including the announcement dates of 
recommendations, reporting analysts, number of analyst following, brokerage houses employing 
the analysts, the level of the consensus recommendation as well as each analyst’s recommendation. 
To identify lending relationships between financial institutions and recommended firms, we use 
the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database, which contains identification of a lead arranger 
                                                 
11  Under the SEC Act of 1934, all institutional investors with security assets of $100 million or more under 
discretionary management are required to report their holdings each quarter on Form 13f. 
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of each borrower’s package loan deal. For stock performance information, Center for Research in 
Security (CRSP) is used for the stock price, return, and shares outstanding. We obtain accounting 
figures in financial statements from COMPUSTAT to see firms’ financial characteristics such as 
total assets, book value, and leverage. 
2.3.2 Sample Selection 
To look at whether investment banks and their asset management arms change stock holdings 
on sued firms, we first identify the sued firms with an event window, e.g. the class period. Filings 
for the lawsuit firms contain three important dates, the class period starting date (CPS), the class 
period ending date (CPE), and the filing date (FD). CPS shows when the wrongdoing starts, and 
CPE is the date at which that particular wrongdoing is uncovered. The period between CPS and 
CPE provides us with an important event window during which informed investors possibly make 
a profit by trading early based on private information, and it, thus, allows us to examine whether 
investment banks with underwriting relationships change their holdings during the event period. 
Figure 1 illustrates the time line of events associated with lawsuits and changes in stockholdings. 
We investigate the sued firms held by top investment banks, including Bank of America, Bear 
Stearns, Goldman Sachs, HSBC holdings, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan 
Stanley, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo. The SEC 13F filing form requires institutional investment 
companies to list their affiliated banks, funds, trusts, and any institutions under parent companies’ 
investment discretion. We manually classified the affiliated institutions of each investment bank 
into 3 groups, such as in-house, asset management, and trust. The classification is based on the 
name of a listed institution. For example, Goldman Sachs reported 8 different companies’ stock 
holdings to the SEC in the first quarter of 2005. Among those companies, Amalgatrust is classified 
as a trust, and Goldman Sachs Asset Management goes to the asset management category. 
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Goldman Sachs & Co., Goldman Sachs International, and Goldman Sachs & Co. Bank are in the 
in-house category. 
Our samples are filtered through three criteria. First, we exclude lawsuit firms that CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT, I/B/E/S, and SEC EDGAR databases do not contain. Second, we delete stocks 
with a price less than $1. Third, we focus on first financial lawsuits for each firm that could contain 
significant negative information and avoid firms that have already had lawsuits before. i.e., we 
keep firms with only one lawsuit. Accordingly, we finalize the sample of 318 firms with 359 filings. 
Table 1 shows the sample firm distribution, reasons for filing securities class action lawsuits, 
and distribution of financial lawsuit filing-year during the sample period. Panel A reports the 
number of sample firms with the number of filings. Panel B presents why the sample firms got  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Time Line of Events associated with Lawsuits and Changes in Stockholdings 
 
 
Class period starting date: 
wrongdoing starts 
Class period ending date: 
wrongdoing uncovered 
Lawsuit filing date: 
lawsuit filed 
Private information production  
and trading period 
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sued. For the total number of 359 lawsuit filings, general financial misreporting and artificially 
inflating securities prices, both violating SEC 1934 section 10(b) and rule, are the most popular  
 
Table 2.1 Financial Lawsuit and Sample Firms 
 
Panel A. Sample firms   
   Number of lawsuits Number of  firms 
Initial sample firms  685 609 
Filtered sued firms   359 318 
 
 
Panel B. Reasons for filing lawsuits    
    Number of  firms % 
General financial misreporting  337 93.87 
Artificially inflate securities prices  280 77.99 
Inadequate internal control  84 23.40 
Bond issuance related  8 2.23 
Equity issuance related  39 10.86 
Mergers and acquisitions related  8 2.23 
Insider trading and conflict of interest  63 17.55 
SEC 1934 Sections 10(b) and rule 10b-5  298 83.01 
SEC 1933 Section 11  82 22.84 
GAAP violation/improper accounting  58 16.16 
Investment banks also sued in the same filing   26 7.24 
Total number of lawsuits   359   
 
 
Panel C. Distribution of financial lawsuits-year 
Year     Number of lawsuits 
2005   25 
2006   59 
2007   79 
2008   108 
2009   71 
2010   15 
2011   2 
Total number of lawsuits     359 
 
Notes: This table reports the number of financial lawsuits and sample firms and the distribution of the reasons for 
filing securities class action lawsuits during 2005 to 2009. 
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reasons. Panel C shows the distribution of financial lawsuits-year. About one-third of the lawsuits 
are concentrated in 2008, indicating that during the 2008 financial crisis, investors actively sued 
firms. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the sample firms. Panel A shows the summary of 
observations. 318 unique firms are analyzed. The total number of institutional holding changes or 
trading on the sample firms is 5,883. The average (median) class periods for all sample firms is 
about 500 (309) days during which sued firms allegedly conduct market manipulation unknown to 
public. Institutional investors with buy-side analysts, in particular, have an incentive to find out 
negative information early, and execute transactions based on the information of companies’ 
wrongdoings not yet uncovered by common investors. After the public announcement of the 
market manipulation, it takes, on average (median), 133 (41) days for shareholders to file for a 
lawsuit against their firms. 
Panel B reports financial characteristics of firms and control variables, including accounting 
variables such as total assets, book value of equity, and long-term debt to total asset ratio, which 
are measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the CPE for each firm during the class period. All 
others including market-adjusted return calculated as past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns 
minus CRSP value-weighted index return, and analyst coverage are measured at the end of the 
quarter prior to the CPE. All the reported numbers are median numbers. The total assets of a 
median firm are worth about $ 1.6 billion. The size of the firm is about $ 1.66 billion. And around 
12 analysts follow the sample firms. 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms 
 
Panel A. Summary of observations   
Number of unique firms in the sample 318 
Total number of institutional holding changes 5,883 
Average (median) number of days during the class period 500 (309) 
Average (median) number of days between the class period end and the lawsuit filing date 133 (41) 
 
 
Panel B. Financial characteristics and control variables for lawsuit firms   
Total assets (million) 1,616 
Market value (million) 1,663 
Book-to-market 0.32 
Leverage 0.12 
Market-adjusted return 0.01 
Average number of analyst following 11.99 
 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the firms with class-action lawsuits in our sample from 2005 to 
2009. Panel A presents the summary of observations, including the number of unique firms, the total number of 
institutional holding changes, and average (median) number of days during the class period. Panel B reports 
financial characteristics and control variables for the sample firms. All the variables are reported as mean values and 
computed using the relevant Compustat and CRSP data items. Total assets and market value are reported in millions. 
Market value is calculated as the price multiplied by shares outstanding. Book-to-Market equals the book value, 
which is common equity, divided by market capitalization. Leverage is a ratio of long term debts to total assets. 
Market-adjusted return (past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns minus CRSP value-weighted index return), 
where t is the month of the class period ending, and the average number of analyst following on a sample firm are 
also reported.  
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Our primary interest is to examine the extent to which institutions with channels for private 
information trade before others trading clients. We start by providing how to measure the 
institutional trading. Three different measures of changes in institutional holdings are constructed 
as follows: 
(1) Raw holding change (RHC), measured simply by changes in stockholdings 
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(2) Percentage holding change (PHC), measured by changes in the proportion of institutional 
ownership 
(3) Portfolio weight change (PWC), calculated as changes in each institution’s portfolio 
weight, where the portfolio weight is shares held by an institution on a stock divided by shares 
held by the institution on all firms 
Size of investment banks may have an impact on the degree of RHC and PHC because a bigger 
institution tends to have more assets under management. Haushalter and Lowry (2011) and 
recently Jordan, Liu, and Wu (2012) use PWC as institutional trading. 
Table 3 reports univariate test results showing holding changes of financial institutions with 
business relationships. In Panel A, while underwriters show unchanged holding positions in all the 
different measures of trading, non-underwriters significantly reduce their portfolio weights of sued 
firms. Non-underwriters may possess private information and trade sued firms prior to the release 
of unpleasant news to public. It may indicate as well that underwriters support their clients even 
with negative news. However, changes in stockholdings are not different between those with 
underwriting relationships and without underwriting relationships. For lenders, they reduce their 
ownership in borrowing firms by -0.0272 %, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
difference in holding changes between lenders and non-lenders is also significant. As for PWC, 
while non-lender significantly decrease the portfolio weights of sample firms, no significant 
difference in trading between the groups is found. Analysts also show similar results to lenders. 
They do not report significant difference between the groups. 
Investment banks may pressure their sponsored funds to support underwriting relationships. 
Hao and Yan (2012) find evidence that investment bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated 
funds because they disproportionately hold large amounts of stocks of underwritten firms. 
  
 
59 
 
Therefore, we examine whether affiliated funds buy or hold those underwritten, sued firms. Panel 
B reports holding changes of the in-house trading divisions and asset management divisions of 
underwriters. The in-house divisions of underwriters reduce their portfolio weighs of underwritten 
firms significantly, while the asset management divisions seem to hold those firms, and there is 
statistically significant difference in holding changes between in-house trading division and 
affiliated asset management firms. This indicates that underwriters with private information tend 
to sell their clients before those firms’ wrongdoings are uncovered. However, their funds may not 
be able to sell them as their banks do. This may create more serious problems because the banks 
benefit themselves from pre-release trading while funds’ shareholders bear the costs, which 
supports the conflicts of interest hypothesis.  
It is possible that underwriters and their affiliated asset management firms sell their client 
firms earlier than the quarter prior to the class period end because they have superior information 
regarding the firms’ business condition. I, thus, perform a series of univariate tests with respect to 
different periods of institutional trading.  
Table 4 presents univariate tests for portfolio weight changes in four different periods. The 
second column reports average portfolio weight changes during the period from a quarter prior to 
the class period start to a quarter prior to the class period end. The third column is from a quarter 
after the class period start to a quarter prior to the class period end. For the fourth and fifth columns, 
the event period starts from a quarter prior to and after the class period, respectively, and both end 
a quarter after the class period end. 
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Table 2.3 Holding Changes of Affiliated and Non-Affiliated Institutional Investors 
 
 
 No. of holding changes RHC PHC PWC 
Panel A: All institutional investors 
Underwriter 274 266,830 -0.0180 0.0010 
  (1.17) (-0.45) (0.02) 
Non-underwriter 5,609 -6,892 -0.0032 -0.0086*** 
  (-0.44) (-0.48) (-2.85) 
Difference  -273,722 0.0147 -0.0096 
    (-1.20) (0.36) (-0.25) 
Lender 541 -69,381 -0.0272** -0.0115 
  (-0.92) (-1.88) (-1.22) 
Non-lender 5,342 13,475 -0.0015 -0.0078** 
  (0.73) (-0.22) (-2.19) 
Difference  82,857 0.0256* 0.0037 
    (1.07) (1.59) (0.37) 
Analyst 2,197 -9,161 -0.0186* -0.0077 
  (-0.22) (-1.37) (-1.25) 
Non-analyst 3,686 14,807 0.0048 -0.0083** 
  (0.92) (0.70) (-2.17) 
Difference  23,968 0.0234* -0.0006 
    (0.55) (1.54) (-0.08) 
     
Panel B: In-house VS. Asset management of underwriters 
In-house 111 624,288 0.0263 -0.0521* 
  (1.41) (0.32) (-1.59) 
Asset management 163 157,546 -0.0776 -0.0261 
  (0.34) (-1.09) (-0.95) 
Difference  -600,880 -0.0745 0.0894* 
    (-1.20) (-0.82) (1.33) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a one-tailed test. 
Notes: This table reports the trading activities of institutional investors during the quarter prior to the class period 
ending date. The sample consists of the firms with class-action lawsuits from 2005 to 2009. Analyst institutions 
report recommendations on covered firms. The trading activities are measured with holding changes, which are 
calculated as follows; (1) RHC, raw changes in shares held by an institutional investor, (2) PHC, percentage changes 
in shares held, and (3) PWC, portfolio weight change. Panel A presents trading activities of each type of institutions 
for the sample firms. Analyst shows all the analyst affiliated institutions’ trading, and non-analyst reports holding 
changes of institutional investors without analyst affiliation. Underwriter and lender present their changes in 
holdings of the sample firms. Test of differences for each type is compared to all institutions without such type of 
business relationships. Panel B present in-house vs. asset management trading activities where the institutions have 
an underwriting relationship with the firm. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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In Panel A, underwriters tend to hold or even increase their positions in the clients until the 
quarter before the class period end, while investment banks without underwriting relationships 
reduce their stockholdings in the same firms significantly. This is consistent with the conflicts of 
interest hypothesis that underwriters try to support their clients. However once the firms’ 
misbehavior is recognized publicly, underwriters are more likely to sell the clients. In the last two 
columns of Panel A, both investment banks with and without underwriting relationships decrease 
the portfolio weights of the firms. 
Trading of in-house and asset management is separately analyzed in Panel B. The average of 
portfolio weight changes for in-house trading is -0.0872 %, negative and statistically significant at 
the 10% level, for the period starting from a quarter prior to the class period start to a quarter prior 
to the class period end, indicating investment banks’ selling. They tend to not trade after the class 
period start until a quarter prior to the class period end, while asset management firms of 
underwriters increase their portfolio weights during the same period. This supports the conflicts of 
interest hypothesis that investment banks use their affiliated funds for their underwriting business. 
The changes in their positions are negative and significant at 1% level when the event period is 
extended to the quarter after the class period end. 
2.4.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
This section presents the empirical results of the multivariate regression analysis. We 
investigate whether business relationships, in particular, the underwriting relationship affect 
institutional investors’ trading behavior. Table 5 presents regression results of institutional trading 
on different types of business relationships and various control variables. The results are reported 
with a year-fixed effect as well as a bank-fixed effect. 
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Table 2.4 Institutional Trading during Different Event Periods 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
No. of  
holding  
changes 
From a quarter prior to  
class period start  
to a quarter prior  
to class period end 
From a quarter after  
class period start  
to a quarter prior  
to class period end 
From a quarter prior to  
class period start  
to a quarter after  
class period end 
From a quarter after  
class period start  
to a quarter after  
class period end 
Panel A: All institutional investors     
Underwriter 202 0.0134 0.0967* -0.2125*** -0.1293** 
  (0.29) (1.46) (-2.17) (-1.83) 
Non-Underwriter 3,896 -0.0160*** -0.0145*** -0.0509*** -0.0494*** 
  (-3.28) (-2.89) (-9.87) (-8.65) 
Difference 4,098 -0.0294 -0.1112** 0.1616* 0.0798 
    (-0.64) (-1.68) (1.64) (1.12) 
      
Panel B: In-house division and Asset management of underwriters     
In-house 80 -0.0872* 0.0323 -0.2501*** -0.1305*** 
  (-1.48) (0.70) (-3.77) (-2.67) 
Asset management 60 0.0108 0.0727** -0.1240*** -0.0622** 
  (0.30) (2.03) (-3.40) (-2.01) 
Difference 140 0.0981* 0.0404 0.1260** 0.0683 
    (1.43) (0.69) (1.66) (1.18) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a one-tailed test. 
Notes: This table reports the trading activities of investment banks for different event periods. The sample consists of firms with class-action lawsuits from 
2005 to 2009. The trading activities are measured with portfolio weight change. Panel A presents trading activities of underwriters and non-underwriters for 
the sample firms. Panel B present in-house vs. asset management trading activities where the institutions have an underwriting relationship with the firm. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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For the first two columns, we use percentage holding change as a dependent variable. Neither 
lending nor underwriting relationships reports a significant difference. Analyst affiliation is also 
not distinguished from zero. Initial portfolio weight is the portfolio weight of an institution at the 
beginning of the quarter prior to the quarter of the class period ending date, indicating that the 
higher initial portfolio weight, the greater the decrease in percentage holding change. The size of 
firms is negatively related to changes in ownership, reporting negatively significant coefficients at 
the 1% level.  
The third and fourth columns provide empirical results with the portfolio weight changes as a 
dependent variable. Among others, initial portfolio weight has a negative and significant 
coefficient, -0.0150, at the 1% level. The results indicate that underwriters as well as lenders tend 
to hold or not sell their underwritten firms or borrowers at the aggregate institutional level. 
However, we do not conclude yet that underwriters and their asset management divisions trade in 
the same manner. It is possible that banks and their funds trade in the opposite direction, making 
the coefficient for each business type insignificant and irrelevant. In order to see whether banks 
and their affiliated asset management divisions trade differently, we separate their holdings from 
each other and have more precise regression analyses. 
Table 6 presents the regression results for portfolio weight changes on in-house and asset 
management holdings. We control for investment bank and year fixed effects. The first column 
shows the results with only underwriters. The result in the second column controls for lending and 
analyst holdings. Looking at the coefficients on in-house underwriter holding in both columns, 
they are -0.0515 and -0.0527 and highly significant. After controlling for other factors, on average, 
investment banks with underwriting relationships with the sued firms decrease their portfolio 
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Table 2.5 Determinants of Change in Institutional Holdings prior to the Class Period Ending 
 
 
Variables PHC PWC 
Analyst affiliation 0.0181 -0.0028 0.0071 0.0018 
 (1.52) (-0.18) (0.82) (0.23) 
Underwriting relationship 0.0153 0.0035 0.0147 0.0090 
 (0.52) (0.12) (0.41) (0.26) 
Lending relationship -0.0006 0.0018 -0.0041 -0.0077 
 (-0.03) (0.08) (-0.23) (-0.47) 
Initial portfolio weight -0.2620*** -0.2698*** -0.0150*** -0.0168*** 
 (-2.97) (-3.00) (-3.37) (-3.27) 
Total institutional ownership 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.07) (0.12) (-0.99) (-1.33) 
Analyst consensus -0.0092 -0.0088 0.0044 0.0048 
 (-0.69) (-0.65) (0.64) (0.70) 
Analyst coverage -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 (-0.48) (0.01) (-0.71) (-0.82) 
Size -0.0178*** -0.0153*** -0.0024 0.0000 
 (-3.78) (-3.26) (-0.34) (0.00) 
Book-to-market -0.0347* -0.0281 -0.0303* -0.0201 
 (-1.86) (-1.48) (-1.72) (-1.24) 
Market-adj return 0.0195 0.0217 -0.0027 -0.0021 
 (0.94) (0.96) (-0.29) (-0.23) 
Intercept 0.5217*** 0.4763*** 0.0670 0.0437 
 (4.00) (3.93) (0.45) (0.28) 
Fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Number of obs. 5,883 5,883 5,883 5,883 
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.01 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
Notes: This table reports regression results of percentage holding change (PHC) and portfolio weight change (PWC) 
for the class period ending. PHC and PWC are the dependent variables. PHC is a percentage change in shares held 
by institutions from quarter t-2 to quarter t-1, where quarter t is the quarter of the class period ending, and PWC is 
calculated as the change in portfolio weight of a stock in an institutional investor’s portfolio from quarter t-2 to 
quarter t-1. Independent variables include dummy variables that represent whether a recommendation is issued by an 
analyst affiliated with a financial institution holding the covered firm (Analyst affiliation), underwriting relationship, 
and lending relationship.  The other independent variables are portfolio weight at the beginning of the quarter 
(Initial portfolio weight), total institutional ownership, median level of recommendation consensus (Analyst 
consensus), analyst coverage, market capitalization (SIZE), book-to-market ratio, market adjusted past 6-month 
returns (Market-adj return) calculated as past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns minus market return (CRSP 
value-weighted index return). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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weight 0.0515 and 0.0527 % more than investment banks without underwriting relationships. 
Asset management firms of the underwriters, however, seem not to sell or hold their positions in 
the underwritten firms. This indicates that underwriters may pressure their funds to support 
underwriting relationships or did not share negative information with them. 
For other variables, lending and analyst relationships do not show any differences from 
institutional investors without those relationships. The initial portfolio weight is negative and 
highly significant, indicating more selling for larger initial positions. The other variables, including 
analyst consensus, coverage, size, book-to-market, and market adjusted returns, are insignificant. 
So far we have looked at institutional trading of the quarter prior to the class period ending dates. 
It is the period that banks have collected private information and also have an incentive to exploit 
it because the general public does not recognize the firms’ market manipulation. Then it is natural 
to think what happened to the quarter of the public announcements of the wrongdoings. 
Table 7 provides regression results for portfolio weight changes in the quarter of CPE. In-
house divisions of underwriters tend to decrease their portfolio weights further. The coefficients 
on in-house underwriter holding are negative and significant at the 5 % level. Interestingly, asset 
management firms of the underwriters also tend to decrease portfolio weights in those firms. The 
coefficients indicate that on average, asset management firms of underwriters decrease their 
portfolio weight of 0.0346 (0.0410) more than the other institutional investors. Initial portfolio 
weight and size are the variables significantly different from zero. Both variables have a negative 
and significant coefficient at the 5% level, indicating that more selling for larger initial positions 
and less selling for smaller firms. 
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Table 2.6 Determinants of Change in In-House and Asset Management Holdings prior to the 
Class Period Ending 
 
 
Variables PWC 
In-house holding -0.0025 -0.0041 
 (-0.21) (-0.33) 
In-house underwriter holding -0.0515** -0.0527** 
 (-2.03) (-2.00) 
Asset management holding -0.0027 -0.0017 
 (-0.24) (-0.17) 
Asset management underwriter holding -0.0145 -0.0136 
 (-0.85) (-0.83) 
In-house analyst holding  0.0042 
  (0.42) 
Asset management analyst holding  -0.0019 
  (-0.30) 
In-house lender holding  0.0013 
  (0.18) 
Asset management lender holding  -0.0019 
  (-0.15) 
Initial portfolio weight -0.0165*** -0.0165*** 
 (-3.18) (-3.15) 
Total institutional ownership -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-1.32) (-1.38) 
Analyst consensus 0.0048 0.0049 
 (0.70) (0.71) 
Analyst coverage -0.0007 -0.0008 
 (-0.81) (-0.87) 
Size 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.06) (0.04) 
Book-to-Market -0.0187 -0.0186 
 (-1.09) (-1.10) 
Market-adj return -0.0011 -0.0010 
 (-0.11) (-0.10) 
Intercept 0.0367 0.0386 
 (0.23) (0.24) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 5,883 5,883 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
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Notes: This table reports regression results of portfolio weight change (PWC) for the class period ending. PWC is 
calculated as the change in portfolio weight of a stock in an institutional investor’s portfolio from quarter t-2 to 
quarter t-1. Independent variables include dummy variables that represent analyst affiliation, underwriting 
relationship, and lending relationship for each in-house holding and asset management holding.  The other 
independent variables are portfolio weight at the beginning of the quarter (Initial portfolio weight), total institutional 
ownership, median level of recommendation consensus (Analyst consensus), analyst coverage, market capitalization 
(SIZE), book-to-market ratio, market adjusted past 6-month returns (Market-adj return) calculated as past 6 month 
(t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns minus market return (CRSP value-weighted index return). T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 8 presents regression results for different event periods. The first two columns only 
include up until a quarter before the class period end. Only asset management underwriting holding 
shows statistical significance at 10% among primary interest variables, supporting their 
underwriting clients of investment banks by increasing their portfolio weights. As with the 
univariate results, the coefficient on in-house underwriting holding is negative and significant at 
the 1% level in column 3. Overall, investment banks tend to hold their clients until firms’ 
wrongdoing is uncovered. 
2.4.3 Client Holdings and Non-Client Holdings of Underwriters and Asset Management Firms 
To provide more evidence on the conflicts of interest hypothesis, we compare the proportion 
of investment banks’ positions on their clients and non-clients. Investment banks have an incentive 
to hold their clients’ stocks to win future underwriting deals. Underwriters thus may pressure their 
funds to hold disproportionately large amounts of client firms even though those firms are 
anticipated to perform poorly. Hao and Yan (2012) find that affiliated mutual funds hold a 
disproportionately large amount of their investment banking clients’ shares. 
Table 9 presents holdings of investment banks and their funds with underwriting relationships. 
Column 1 and Column 2 report portfolio weights of the institutions on clients and non-clients,  
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Table 2.7 Determinants of Change in In-House and Asset Management Holdings during the 
Quarter of the Class Period Ending Date 
 
Variables PWC 
In-house holding 0.0120 0.0060 
 (1.02) (0.54) 
In-house underwriter holding -0.0814** -0.0821** 
 (-2.19) (2.09) 
Asset management holding 0.0248 0.0141 
 (1.48) (1.06) 
Asset management underwriter holding -0.0346* -0.0410** 
 (-1.72) (-2.02) 
In-house analyst holding  0.0198 
  (1.16) 
Asset management analyst holding  0.0209** 
  (2.12) 
In-house lender holding  -0.0208 
  (-0.08) 
Asset management lender holding  0.0220* 
  (1.84) 
Initial portfolio weight -0.0377** -0.0382** 
 (-2.26) (-2.29) 
Total institutional ownership 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.56) (0.47) 
Analyst consensus 0.0100 0.0103 
 (0.77) (0.81) 
Analyst coverage 0.0028 0.0026 
 (1.26) (1.22) 
Size -0.0320** -0.0325** 
 (-2.20) (-2.21) 
Book-to-Market 0.0033 0.0033 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
Market-adj return -0.0029 -0.0015 
 (-0.25) (-0.13) 
Intercept 0.5946** 0.6082** 
 (2.00) (2.01) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 5,883 5,883 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
Notes: This table reports regression results of portfolio weight change (PWC) for the class period ending. PWC is 
calculated as the change in portfolio weight of a stock in an institutional investor’s portfolio from quarter t-2 to 
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quarter t-1. Independent variables include dummy variables that represent analyst affiliation, underwriting 
relationship, and lending relationship for each in-house holding and asset management holding.  The other 
independent variables are portfolio weight at the beginning of the quarter (Initial portfolio weight), total institutional 
ownership, median level of recommendation consensus (Analyst consensus), analyst coverage, market capitalization 
(SIZE), book-to-market ratio, market adjusted past 6-month returns (Market-adj return) calculated as past 6 month 
(t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns minus market return (CRSP value-weighted index return). T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
respectively. Underwriters and affiliated asset management firms hold significantly larger amount 
of stocks of client firms than non-client firms among sued firms. Investment banks hold a portfolio 
weight of 0.0058% in the underwritten, sued firms, relative to a portfolio weight of 0.0003% in 
the non-underwritten, sued firms. Similar to the aggregate positions, in-house and asset 
management holdings on clients are significantly larger than their positions on non-client holdings.  
2.4.4 Stock Performance 
In this section, we explore stock price performance around the public announcement of the 
firms’ wrongdoings. We evaluate stock price performance using a four-factor model (Carhart, 
1997). 
 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4 ×𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, 
where 𝑅𝑡is the excess return in month t on a firm, 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the CRSP value-weighted market 
return minus the risk-free rate in month t, and 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 are month t return of 
portfolios based on size, book-to-market, and momentum effects. The abnormal return is the 
difference between realized return and expected return based on the model. The class period ending 
date when general public realize firms’ manipulation is the event date. 
Table 10 present cumulative abnormal returns of sample firms around the class ending dates. 
In Panel A, all firms and underwritten firms have negative and significant cumulative abnormal 
returns over the past 6 months. They have larger negative abnormal returns around the event month. 
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Table 2.8 Multivariate Regression Results for Portfolio Weight Change during Different Event Periods 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 
From a quarter prior to  
class period start  
to a quarter prior  
to class period end 
From a quarter after  
class period start  
to a quarter prior  
to class period end 
From a quarter prior to  
class period start  
to a quarter after  
class period end 
From a quarter after  
class period start  
to a quarter after  
class period end 
In-house holding -0.0007 -0.0150 0.0224 0.0075 
 (-0.06) (-0.78) (1.48) (0.38) 
In-house underwriter holding -0.0832 0.0293 -0.1623*** -0.0523 
 (-1.52) (0.60) (-2.71) (-1.23) 
Asset management holding -0.0049 -0.0079 0.0389* 0.0297 
 (-0.34) (-0.52) (1.85) (1.43) 
Asset management  underwriter holding 0.0326 0.0693* -0.0081 0.0310 
 (0.71) (1.87) (-0.24) (1.13) 
Initial portfolio weight -0.0462*** -0.0475*** -0.0869*** -0.0736*** 
 (-3.23) (-3.21) (-3.03) (-3.66) 
Total institutional ownership -0.0007** -0.0003* -0.0004 -0.0001 
 (-2.03) (-1.90) (-1.10) (-0.43) 
Analyst consensus 0.0274* 0.0030 0.0290* 0.0037 
 (1.91) (0.24) (1.96) (0.21) 
Analyst coverage -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0044** 0.0042** 
 (-0.18) (-0.40) (2.11) (2.41) 
Size -0.0026 0.0029 -0.0499*** -0.0441*** 
 (-0.20) (0.27) (-3.71) (-3.43) 
Book-to-market -0.0498 -0.0740** -0.0731 -0.0964*** 
 (-1.41) (-2.48) (-1.49) (-2.77) 
Market-adj return 0.0333 0.0278 0.0189 0.0142 
 (1.34) (1.17) (0.63) (0.62) 
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(Table 2.8 continued) 
 
    
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 4,098 4,098 4,098 4,098 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
Notes: This table reports regression results of portfolio weight change (PWC) for the class period ending. PWC is calculated as the change in portfolio weight 
of a stock in an institutional investor’s portfolio from quarter t-2 to quarter t-1. Independent variables include dummy variables that represent underwriting 
relationship for each in-house holding and asset management holding.  The other independent variables are portfolio weight at the beginning of the quarter 
(Initial portfolio weight), total institutional ownership, median level of recommendation consensus (Analyst consensus), analyst coverage, market 
capitalization (SIZE), book-to-market ratio, market adjusted past 6-month returns (Market-adj return) calculated as past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns 
minus market return (CRSP value-weighted index return). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 2.9 Comparison of Client Holdings and Non-Client Holdings 
 
 
 Client holding Non-client holding Difference 
  (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
Aggregate holding 0.0058 0.0003 0.0054*** 
   (7.01) 
In-house holding 0.0066 0.0003 0.0063*** 
   (5.07) 
Asset management holding 0.0047 0.0004 0.0042*** 
      (6.30) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
Notes: This table reports holdings of investment banks and their firms with underwriting relationships. Holdings are measured as the total number of shares 
held by each institution on a firm during a quarter prior to the quarter of the class period ending date divided by the total number of shares held by the 
institution on all firms during the same quarter. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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It seems that sued firms perform poorly before their wrongdoings are uncovered, which may lead 
institutional investors to sell those firms. Interestingly, while overall sample firms continue to 
perform poorly after the class period ending date, the underwritten firms perform well. Their 
cumulative abnormal return is 0.0710 or 7.10%, which is significant at the 10% level. It is possible 
that underwriters support their clients by purchasing stocks. As a recent case of an IPO, Facebook, 
on May 18, 2012, went public at its debut price of $38 per share, which fell to $27.72 on June 1. 
As the price fell, the lead underwriter of Facebook, Morgan Stanley, reportedly stepped in to keep 
the stock from breaking through its offer price. Schultz and Zaman (1994) and Aggarwal (2000) 
document that underwriters repurchase large quantities of stock in the aftermarket. 
 
Table 2.10 Stock Performance around the Class Period Ending Date 
 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns of sample firms around the class ending dates  
Sample firms N (-6, -2) (-1, +1) (+1, +6) 
All firms 318 -0.1296*** -0.3514*** -0.0916*** 
  (-8.34) (-29.21) (-5.38) 
Underwritten firms 55 -0.1405*** -0.3026*** 0.0710* 
    (-4.05) (-11.27) (1.87) 
 
     
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns of underwritten firms around the class ending dates  
Positions on underwritten firms N (-6, -2) (-1, +1) (+1, +6) 
Increase 28 -0.0477 -0.2259*** 0.1432*** 
  (-1.07) (-6.58) (2.95) 
Decrease 27 -0.1960*** -0.2770*** 0.0069 
    (-4.08) (-7.46) (0.13) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
Notes: This table reports abnormal returns around the class period ending dates. Abnormal returns are calculated 
using the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997). Panel A presents cumulative abnormal returns on various event 
windows for all sample firms and underwritten firms. The number of firms in each category (N) is also reported. The 
event date is the class period ending date when general public realize firms’ wrongdoings. Panel B presents 
cumulative abnormal returns of underwritten firms that underwriters and affiliated asset management firms increase 
or decrease their portfolio weights of the firms during a quarter prior to the quarter of the class period ending dates. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Panel B shows whether the positive abnormal returns come from the support of underwriters. 
Among the underwritten firms, we separate the firms in which underwriters and their affiliated 
asset management firms increase their positions from the firms without such an increase in 
positions. We find that firms with support from underwriters have positive and significant 
abnormal returns, 0.1432 or 14.32%, after the class period ending date, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Firms without support have insignificant positive abnormal returns.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the pressure of conflicts of interest plays role in institutional 
trading behavior. Investment banks may use their affiliated funds to support clients of the 
underwriting business, which creates costs borne by the funds’ shareholders. Empirical evidence 
does support the conflict of interest hypothesis, showing that affiliated asset management firms do 
not decrease or even increase their stockholdings of the underwritten, sued firms significantly in 
the class period. Both in-house investment banks and their affiliated asset management firms hold 
disproportionately large amounts of stocks of their underwritten clients, which generates negative 
abnormal returns. Overall underwriters’ support for the clients comes at the fund shareholders’ 
expense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
74 
 
REFERENCES 
Aggarwal, Reena, 2000, Stabilization activities by underwriters after initial public offerings, 
Journal of Finance 55, 1075-1103 
 
Barber, Brad, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen Mcnichols, and Brett Trueman, 2001, Can investors 
profit from the prophets? Security analyst recommendations and stock returns, Journal of 
Finance 56, 531-563 
 
Brockman, Paul, Dennis Y. Chung, and Xuemin (Sterling) Yan, 2009, Block ownership, trading 
activity, and market liquidity, Journal of Financial and Quantitative analysis 44, 1403-1426 
 
Busse, Jeffrey A., T. Clifton Green, and Narasimhan Jegadeesh, 2012, Buy-side trades and sell-
side recommendations: Interactions and information content, Journal of Financial Markets 15, 
207-232 
 
Chan, Kin Wai, Charles Chang, and Albert Wang, 2009, Put your money where your mouth is: 
Do financial firms follow their own recommendations?, Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance 49, 1095-1112 
 
Chemmanur, Thomas J., and Paolo Fulghieri, 1994, Investment bank reputation, information 
production, and financial intermediation, Journal of Finance 49, 57-79 
 
Christophe, Stephen E., Michael G. Ferri, and Jim Hsieh, 2010, Informed trading before analyst 
downgrades: Evidence from short sellers, Journal of Financial Economics 95, 85-106 
 
Duarte-Silva, Tiago, 2010, The market for certification by external parties: Evidence from 
underwriting and banking relationships, Journal of Financial Economics 98, 568-582 
 
Green, T. Clifton, 2006, The value of client access to analyst recommendations, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 1-24 
 
Groysberg, Boris, Paul M. Healy, and David A. Maber, 2011, What drives sell-side analyst 
compensation at high-status investment banks?, Journal of Accounting Research 49, 969-1000 
 
Hao, Qing and Xuemin Yan, 2012, The performance of investment bank-affiliated mutual funds: 
conflicts of interest or informational advantage?, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
47, 537-565 
 
Haushaler, David and Michelle Lowry, 2011, When do banks listen to their analysts? Evidence 
from mergers and acquisitions, Review of Financial Studies 24, 321-357 
 
Hsieh, Jim, Lilian Ng, and Qinghai Wang, 2005, How informative are analyst recommendations 
and insider trades?, Unpublished working paper, George Mason University, VA. 
 
  
 
75 
 
Irvine, Paul, 2004, Analysts’ forecasts and brokerage-firm trading, Accounting Review 79, 125-
149 
 
Irvine, Paul, Marc Lipson, and Andrew Puckett, 2007, Tipping, Review of Financial Studies 20, 
741-768 
 
Jacob, John and Steve Rock, and David P. Weber, 2008, Do non-investment bank analysts make 
better earnings forecasts?, Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 23, 23-61 
 
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, Joonghyuk Kim, Susan D. Kische, and Charles M. C. Lee, 2004, 
Analyzing the analysts: When do recommendations add value?, Journal of Finance 59, 1083-
1124 
 
Johnston, Rick, 2009, Does analyst stock ownership affect reporting behavior?, Unpublished 
working paper, Purdue University, IN 
 
Jordan, Bradford D., Mark H. Liu, and Qun Wu, 2012, Do investment banks listen to their own 
analysts?, Journal of Banking & Finance 36, 1452-1463  
 
Juergens, Jennifer L. and Laura Lindsey, 2009, Getting out early: An analysis of market making 
activity at the recommending analyst’s firm, Journal of Finance 64, 2327-2359 
 
Kacperczyk, Marcin, Clemens Sialm, and Lu Zheng, 2005, On the industry concentration of 
actively managed equity mutual funds, Journal of Finance 60, 1983-2011 
 
Kadan, Ohad, Leonardo Madureira, Rong Wang, and Tzachi Zach, 2009, Conflicts of interest 
and stock recommendations: The effect of the global settlement and related regulations, Review 
of Financial Studies 22, 4189-4217 
 
Kim, Sok Tae, Ji-Chai Lin, and Myron B. Slovin, 1997, Market structure, informed trading, and 
analysts’ recommendations, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 32, 507-524 
 
Ljungqvist, Alexander, Christopher Malloy, and Felicia Marston, 2009, Rewriting history, 
Journal of Finance 64, 1935-1960 
 
Ljungqvist, Alexander, Felicia Marston, Laura T. Starks, Kelsey D. Wei, and Hong Yan, 2007, 
Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors,  
Journal of Financial Economics 85, 420-456 
 
Ljungqvist, Alexander, Felicia Marston, and Willaim Wilhelm, 2006, Competing for securities 
underwriting mandates: Banking relationships and analyst recommendations, Journal of Finance 
61, 301-340 
 
Loh, Roger K. and Rene M. Stulz, 2011, When are analyst recommendation changes influential?, 
Review of Financial Studies 24, 593-627 
  
 
76 
 
Mao, Connie X. and Wei-Ling Song, 2012, Does syndicate relationship affect analysts’ incentive 
to produce information? Evidence from recommended firms’ securities class action lawsuits 
 
Massa, Massimo and Zahid Rehman, 2008, Information flows within financial conglomerates: 
evidence from the banks-mutual funds relation, Journal of Financial Economics 89, 288-306 
 
Mehran, Hamid, and Rene M. Stulz, 2007, The economics of conflicts of interest in financial 
institutions, Journal of Financial Economics 85, 267-296  
 
Michaely, Roni and Kent L. Womack, 1999, Conflict of interest and the credibility of 
underwriter analyst recommendations, Review of Financial Studies 12, 653-686 
 
Mola, Simona, and Massimo Guidolin, 2009, Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism, 
Journal of Financial Economics 93, 108-137 
 
O’Brien, Patricia C., Maureen F. Mcnichols, and Hsiou-Wei Lin, 2005, Analyst impartiality and 
investment banking relationships, Journal of Accounting Research 43, 623-650 
 
Paul J. Irvine, 2004, Analysts’ forecasts and brokerage-firm trading, Accounting Review, 79, 
pp125-149 
 
Ritter, Jay R. and Donghang Zhang, 2007, Affiliated mutual funds and the allocation of initial 
public offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 86, 337-368 
 
Schultz, Paul H. and Mir A. Zaman, 1994, Aftermarket support and underpricing of initial public 
offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 35, 199-219 
 
Taha, Ahmed E. and John V. Petrocelli, 2012, Sending mixed messages: Investor interpretations 
of disclosures of analyst stock ownership, Unpublished working paper, Wake Forest University, 
NC 
 
Teo, Melvyn and Sung-Gon Chung, 2012, Hedge funds and analyst conflicts of interests, 
Unpublished working paper, Singapore Management University 
 
Womack, Kent, 1996, Do brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment value?, Journal 
of Finance 51, 137-167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
77 
 
APPENDIX A 
Dependent variables  
RHC 
The changes in the number of shares held by institutions from quarter t-2 to quarter t-
1, where quarter t is the quarter of analysts issuing the first downgrade (upgrade) 
PHC 
The percentage change in shares held by institutions from quarter t-2 to quarter t-1, 
where quarter t is the quarter of analysts issuing the first downgrade (upgrade) 
PWC 
The portfolio weight change for a stock held by institutions from quarter t-2 to 
quarter t-1, where quarter t is the quarter of analysts issuing the first downgrade 
(upgrade) 
APWC 
The portfolio weight change (PWC) less the change in the weight of the stock in the 
overall 13f institutional investors 
 
Independent variables  
Analyst holding (AH) 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if a recommendation is issued by an analyst affiliated 
with a financial institution holding the covered firm; 0 otherwise 
Underwriter AH 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if an analyst is employed by an investment bank 
underwriting a firm in the past 3 years; 0 otherwise 
Lender AH 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if an analyst issuing a recommendation on a firm is 
employed by a bank lending the firm in the past 2 years; 0 otherwise 
Independent IB AH 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if an analyst with investment banking issuing a 
recommendation on a firm is independent of the firm; 0 otherwise 
Independent 
non-IB AH 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if an analyst without investment banking issuing a 
recommendation on a firm is independent of the firm; 0 otherwise 
Reputation 
Investment bank’s reputation based on the bank’s market share in equity (debt) 
underwriting (%), calculated as a bank’s aggregated total dollar amount in lead 
underwriting divided by all deal amount in equity (bond) markets in a given year 
First revision issuer 
(FRI) 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if an analyst issues the first downgrade (upgrade); 0 
otherwise 
Allstar analyst 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if a recommendation is issued by an Institutional Investor 
“All-American” analyst; 0 otherwise 
Initial portfolio weight Portfolio weight of a bank for a stock at the beginning of a quarter 
Total institutional 
ownership 
Total percentage of institutional ownership of a firm at the beginning of a quarter 
SIZE Market capitalization at the beginning of a quarter 
Book-to-market Book-to-market ratio of a stock at the end of a quarter 
Market adj. return past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns minus CRSP value-weighted index return 
Analyst coverage Analyst coverage (number of analyst following a stock) 
Analyst consensus 
The median level of consensus: 1 (Sell), 2 (Underperform), 3 (Hold), 4 (Buy), and 5 
(Strong Buy)  
Post-Rec 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if institutional trading take place during the post-
recommendation period 
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APPENDIX B 
Dependent variables  
RHC 
The changes in the number of shares held by institutions from quarter t-2 to quarter t-
1, where quarter t is the quarter of analysts issuing the first downgrade (upgrade) 
PHC 
The percentage change in shares held by institutions from quarter t-2 to quarter t-1, 
where quarter t is the quarter of analysts issuing the first downgrade (upgrade) 
PWC 
The portfolio weight change for a stock held by institutions from quarter t-2 to 
quarter t-1, where quarter t is the quarter of analysts issuing the first downgrade 
(upgrade) 
 
Independent variables  
Analyst 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if a recommendation is issued by an analyst affiliated 
with a financial institution holding the covered firm; 0 otherwise 
Underwriter 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if an analyst is employed by an investment bank 
underwriting a firm in the past 3 years; 0 otherwise 
Lender 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if an analyst issuing a recommendation on a firm is 
employed by a bank lending the firm in the past 2 years; 0 otherwise 
In-house Dummy variable, equal to 1 if investment banks hold a stock; 0 otherwise 
Asset management Dummy variable, equal to 1 if asset management firms hold a stock; 0 otherwise 
Initial portfolio weight Portfolio weight of a bank for a stock at the beginning of a quarter 
Total institutional 
ownership 
Total percentage of institutional ownership of a firm at the beginning of a quarter 
SIZE Market capitalization at the beginning of a quarter 
Book-to-market Book-to-market ratio of a stock at the end of a quarter 
Market adj. return past 6 month (t-7 to t-1) cumulated returns minus CRSP value-weighted index return 
Analyst coverage Analyst coverage (number of analyst following a stock) 
Analyst consensus 
The median level of consensus: 1 (Sell), 2 (Underperform), 3 (Hold), 4 (Buy), and 5 
(Strong Buy)  
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